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ΔΗΛΧ΢Η ΕΚΠΟΝΗ΢Η΢ ΜΕΣΑΠΣΤΥΙΑΚΗ΢ ΕΡΓΑ΢ΙΑ΢ 
  
 
«Γειψλσ ππεχζπλα φηη ε ζπγθεθξηκέλε κεηαπηπρηαθή εξγαζία γηα ηε ιήςε ηνπ 
Μεηαπηπρηαθνχ Γηπιψκαηνο Δηδίθεπζεο ζηε Γηνίθεζε Δπηρεηξήζεσλ, έρεη ζπγγξαθεί 
απφ εκέλα πξνζσπηθά θαη δελ έρεη ππνβιεζεί νχηε έρεη εγθξηζεί ζην πιαίζην θάπνηνπ 
άιινπ κεηαπηπρηαθνχ ή πξνπηπρηαθνχ ηίηινπ ζπνπδψλ, ζηελ Διιάδα ή ζην 
εμσηεξηθφ.  
 
Η εξγαζία απηή έρνληαο εθπνλεζεί απφ εκέλα, αληηπξνζσπεχεη ηηο πξνζσπηθέο κνπ 
απφςεηο επί ηνπ ζέκαηνο. Οη πεγέο ζηηο νπνίεο αλέηξεμα γηα ηελ εθπφλεζε ηεο 
ζπγθεθξηκέλεο κεηαπηπρηαθήο αλαθέξνληαη ζην ζχλνιφ ηνπο, δίλνληαο πιήξεηο 
αλαθνξέο ζηνπο ζπγγξαθείο, ζπκπεξηιακβαλνκέλσλ θαη ησλ πεγψλ πνπ 
ελδερνκέλσο ρξεζηκνπνηήζεθαλ απφ ην δηαδίθηπν». 
 
 
Ονομαηεπώνςμο       Yπογπαθή 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Athens MBA; “Contagion effects in the government bond 
markets. Evidence from the EMU 2.0 crisis” 
 
Ιωάννης Ξηνταρόπουλος                                     2016 Page 3 
 
Table of contents 
 
First part: Contagion effects during the Global Financial Crisis 
1. Definition of the contagion during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007 – 2009 
2. Transmission of sovereign risk in the Euro crisis 
3. Global transmission channels for international bank lending 
4. Mutual funds flows and the geography of contagion 
5. Global financial crisis and emerging stock market contagion 
6. An industry analysis of the European financial market dependence 
7. The case of sovereign debt of stressed euro-area countries 
8. Evidence from the Greek sovereign bonds market 
9. The double hazard of underinvestment and unemployment in the Euro area 
10. Reflections of corruption and tax evasion on the Greek tragedy 
11. An analytic overview of the crisis in the Euro area 
 
Second part: EMU 2.0 Drawing lessons from the crisis – a new 
framework for stability and growth 
1. The emergence of the sovereign debt crisis and its management 
2. A turning point in 2012 as ECB initiatives and a critical mass of reforms 
stabilised the euro area 
3. EU/IMF economic programmes: analytical and institutional aspects 
4. Policies for stability and growth are possible in EMU 2.0 
5. Remarking Conclusions 
 
References 
 
 
 
Athens MBA; “Contagion effects in the government bond 
markets. Evidence from the EMU 2.0 crisis” 
 
Ιωάννης Ξηνταρόπουλος                                     2016 Page 4 
 
ΠΕΡΙΛΗΦΗ 
 
Οπιζμόρ ηηρ «μόλςνζηρ» καηά ηη μεηάδοζη ηηρ παγκόζμιαρ οικονομικήρ 
κπίζηρ. 
Η ιέμε «κφιπλζε» εκθαλίδεηαη γηα πξψηε θνξά ζηελ βηβιηνγξαθία κε ην μέζπαζκα 
ηεο «Αζηαηηθήο γξίπεο» θαη ηνπ «Ρσζηθνχ ηνχ» γηα λα πεξηγξάςεη ηα θαηλφκελα 
δηάδνζεο θαη δηάρπζεο ηεο νηθνλνκηθήο θξίζεο. Μέρξη ζήκεξα έλα κεγάιν κέξνο ηεο 
δηεζλνχο βηβιηνγξαθίαο αζρνιείηαη κε ηελ κειέηε ησλ θαηλνκέλσλ απηψλ, παξφια 
απηά δελ ππάξρεη ακθηβνιία φηη ιφγσ ηεο έληαζεο θαη ηνπ βάζνπο ηεο παγθφζκηαο 
θξίζεο πνπ έρεη μεζπάζεη ηα ηειεπηαία ρξφληα ε αλάγθε γηα ζπζηεκαηηθφηεξε θαη 
δηεμνδηθφηεξε κειέηε ησλ κεραληζκψλ κε ηνπο νπνίνπο κεηαδίδεηαη ε θξίζε θξίλεηαη 
εμφρσο ζεκαληηθή. Η θξίζε πνπ μέζπαζε ην 2008 θαη απιψζεθε ζρεδφλ αθαξηαία ζε 
φιε ηελ πθήιην, κπνξεί λα ζπγθξηζεί κφλν κε ηελ κεγαιε χθεζε ηνπ 1929. Δλψ 
κεγάιν θνκκάηη ηεο έξεπλαο επηθεληξψλεηαη ζηα θαλάιηα δηάδνζεο ηεο θξίζεο, ιίγν 
θσο έρεη πέζεη ζηνπο ηξφπνπο κε ηνπο νπνίνπο κπνξεί απηή λα αληηκεησπηζηεί. 
Έλαο άιινο ζεκαληηθφο παξάγνληαο είλαη ε ηαρχηεηα κε ηελ νπνία κεηαδίδεηαη ε 
θξίζε απφ ην επίθεληξφ ηεο πξνο ηελ πεξηθέξεηα, θαζψο θαη ε δηάθξηζε ζε 
αλακελφκελεο θαη κε αλακελφκελεο επηπηψζεηο, αθνχ νη πξψηεο κπνξνχλ λα 
πξνβιεθζνχλ θαη λα αληηκεησπηζηνχλ ελψ νη άιιεο είλαη απξφβιεπηεο. Όηαλ νη 
αγνξέο αιιειεπηδξνχλ κε δνκηθφ θαη ζεκειηψδε ηξφπν, ζα πεξίκελε θαλείο φηη ε 
έμνδνο απφ ηελ θξίζε ζηελ αγνξά ζηελ νπνία απηή μέζπαζε αξρηθά ζα νδεγνχζε θαη 
ηηο ππφινηπεο ζε κηα πην γξήγνξε «ζεξαπεία». ΢ε θάζε πεξίπησζε ε πιεηνςεθία 
ησλ εξεπλεηψλ δηεζλψο ζπκθσλεί φηη ε εμάπισζε ηεο θξίζεο ηνπ 2008 νθείιεηαη 
ηφζν ζηνπο παξάγνληεο αιιειεπίδξαζεο θαη παγθνζκηνπνίεζεο ηεο νηθνλνκίαο, φζν 
θαη ζηα θαηλφκελα κφιπλζεο.  
Δίλαη θνηλψο απνδεθηφ φηη νη αλαδπφκελεο νηθνλνκίεο ζηελ Αλαηνιηθή Δπξψπε θαη 
Κεληξηθή Αζία (παξφιν φηη είλαη ζε κεγάιν βαζκφ εηεξνγελείο), αλέθακςαλ ηαρχηεξα 
θαη ζε κεγαιχηεξν βαζκφ απ΄ φηη νη αλεπηπγκέλεο νηθνλνκίεο, γεγνλφο πνπ 
αλαδπθλείεη αλάγιπθα ηελ ζεκαζία λα κειεηεζνχλ θαη λα αλαιπζνχλ ηα θαλάιηα θαη 
νη ηξφπνη δηάδσζεο, φρη κφλν ησλ αξλεηηθψλ shock αιιά θαη απηά ησλ ζεηηθψλ. 
Οη Forbes θαη Rigobon (2002) δηεηχπσζαλ ηνλ πην δηαδεδνκέλν νξηζκφ γηα ηε 
«κφιπλζε»: Μηα ζεκαληηθή αχμεζε ζηελ ζπζρέηηζε κεηαμχ αγνξψλ, φηαλ εκθαλίδεηαη 
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έλα ηζρπξφ ζνθ ζε κία ή ζε πεξηζζφηεξεο ρψξεο. Με άιια ιφγηα ε κφιπλζε 
εκθαλίδεηαη φηαλ ε ζπζρέηηζε κεηαμχ δχν αγνξψλ κεγηζηνπνηείηαη κεηά απφ έλα 
ηζρπξφ ζνθ ζε κία απ΄ απηέο, ελψ φηαλ ε ζπρέηηζε είλαη ηζρπξή ζηηο πεξηφδνπο 
νκαιφηεηαο κηιάκε γηα θαηλφκελα αιιειεπίδξαζεο θαη παγθνζκηνπνίεζεο. ΢ε θάζε 
πεξίπησζε ε κφιπλζε είλαη ε ππεξβάιινπζα ζπζρέηηζε θαη ελαξκφληζε δχν αγνξψλ, 
ζε ζρέζε κε ηηο πξνβιέςεηο ησλ δηαθφξσλ κνληέισλ. 
Η κειέηε θαη ε αλάιπζε ηεο κεηάδνζεο ηεο κφιπλζεο έρεη ηζρπξφ αληίθηππν ζηελ 
ράξαμε ησλ καθξννηθνλνκηθψλ πνιηηηθψλ. 
1. Βνεζά ζηελ ράξαμε λνκηζκαηηθήο θαη δεκνζηνλνκηθήο πνιηηηθήο.  
2. Βνεζά ζηελ θαηαλφεζε ησλ δηεξγαζηψλ πνπ ιακβάλνπλ ρψξα ζε κηα κεγάιε 
πνιηηηθν-νηθνλνκηθή έλσζε φπσο ε Δπξσπαηθή Έλσζε, θαζψο απνηειείηαη απφ 
θξάηε κέιε κε ηδηαηηεξφηεηεο θαη δηαθνξέο κεηαμχ ηνπο. 
3. Βειηηψλεη ηνπο ζηφρνπο θαη ηηο ζηξαηεγηθέο ζπκκαρίεο ησλ θξαηψλ ζε φηη 
αθνξά ην δηεζλέο εκπφξην θαη ηηο γεληθφηεξεο ζπλεξγαζίεο.  
4.         Βειηηψλεη ηελ θαηαλφεζε θαη αλάιπζε ησλ φξσλ φπσο παγθνζκηνπνίεζε, θαη 
αιιειεπίδξαζε ζηελ δηεζλνπνηεκέλε νηθνλνκία. 
Η μεηάδοζη ηηρ κπίζηρ ζηιρ αναδςόμενερ αγοπέρ. 
Σελ πεξίνδν 2007-2009 ε παγθφζκηα ρξεκαηννηθνλνκηθή θξίζε ήηαλ κηα αιπζηδσηή 
αληίδξαζε ηνπ πηζησηηθνχ θηλδχλνπ πνπ εκπεξηείρεην ζηα ρξεκαηννηθνλνκηθά 
εξγαιεία θαη ππξνδνηήζεθε απφ ηελ θξίζε ξεπζηφηεηαο ζην ηξαπεδηθφ ζχζηεκα ησλ 
Ηλσκέλσλ Πνιηηεηψλ. Ήηαλ ν ζπλδπαζκφο ηξηψλ ζχλζεησλ ρξεκαηννηθνλνκηθψλ 
εξγαιείσλ : Σηηινπνηεκέλα ζηεγαζηηθά δάλεηα, Δλερπξηαζκέλα ρξεφγξαθα (CDO) θαη 
΢πκθσλίεο αληαιιαγήο πηζησηηθνχ θηλδχλνπ (CDS), ηα νπνία νδεγεζαλ ζηελ 
πηζησηηθή θξίζε ζηελ ζηεγαζηηθή αγνξά ησλ Ηλσκέλσλ Πνιηηεηψλ, ε νπνία αξγφηεξα 
εμαπιψζεθε παγθνζκίσο. Η θπξηφηεξε δηαθνξά ηεο ζρεηηθά κε ηηο πξνεγνχκελεο 
θξίζεηο, φπσο ην 1997-1998 ε Αζηαηηθή θξίζε, ην 1998 ε Ρσζηθή θξίζε ή ην 1999 ε 
θξίζε ηεο Βξαδηιίαο, είλαη φηη ε θξίζε ηνπ 2007-2009 πξνήιζε απφ ηε κεγαιχηεξε θαη 
πην επηδξαζηηθή νηθνλνκία ηνπ θφζκνπ, απηή ησλ Ηλσκέλσλ Πνιηηεηψλ, θαη ζχληνκα 
εμαπιψζεθε ζε φιεο ηηο αγνξέο παγθνζκίσο 
Δίλαη θαζνιηθά απνδεθηφ φηη νη αγνξέο δηεζλψο αληηδξνχλ άκεζα θαη αθαξηαία ζε 
επίπεδν ηηκψλ θαη δηαθχκαλζεο, θαηά ηηο κεγάιεο ρξεκαηννηθνλνκηθέο θξίζεηο. 
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Ωζηφζν ε ηαρχηεηα θαη ην κέγεζνο ησλ επηδξάζεσλ απηψλ, θαζψο θαη ν ξπζκφο κε 
ηνλ νπνίνλ αλαθάπηνπλ νη αγνξέο δηαθέξνπλ κεηαμχ ηνπο, γεγνλφο πνπ έρεη κεγάιε 
επίπησζε ζηελ ηηκνιφγεζε ησλ ηίηισλ δηεζλψο, ηε δηαρείξηζε κεγάισλ 
ραξηνθπιαθίσλ θαη ηελ αληηζηάζκηζε ηνπ θηλδχλνπ. 
Δλ ησ κεηαμχ, είλαη ηδηαίηεξα ρξήζηκν λα εμεηάζνπκε ηελ επίδαξζε ηεο παγθφζκηαο 
ρξεκαηννηθνλνκηθήο θξίζεο ζηηο ρψξεο BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South 
Africa), θαζψο ζεσξνχληαη ε αηκνκεραλή ηεο παγθφζκηαο νηθνλνκίαο θαη νη αγνξέο 
ηνπο είλαη ε πξψηε επηινγή ησλ δηαρεηξηζηψλ παγθνζκίσο γηα δηαθνξνπνίεζε ησλ 
ραξηνθπιαθίσλ ηνπο. Οη αγνξέο ησλ Ηλσκέλσλ Πνιηηεηψλ θαη ησλ BRICS 
ζπλδένληαη άξξεθηα κε ηηο δηαθπκάλζεηο ηνπο. Η αιιειεπίδξαζε απηή εμεγεί ην 
γεγνλφο φηη νη αιιαγέο ζηε δηαθχκαλζε ζηηο αγνξέο ησλ BRICS κπνξεί λα εξκελεπηεί 
κφλν ιακβάλνληαο ππφςε ηηο αληίζηνηρεο κεηαβνιέο ζηελ αγνξα ησλ ΗΠΑ, θαζψο 
θαη φηη ζπκβάιιεη ζηελ αθξίβεηα ησλ πξνβιέςεσλ. 
Μεηάδοζη ηος πίζκος ηων κπαηικών ομολόγων ζηη ζώνη ηος Εςπώ. 
΢ηα ηέιε ηνπ 2009, θαζψο ε παγθφζκηα νηθνλνκία έβγαηλε απφ ηελ Μεγάιε Ύθεζε, ε 
θξίζε εζληθνχ ρξένπο ρηππνχζε ηελ Δπξψπε κε απίζηεπηε νξκή θαη κέλνο. Φφβνη γηα 
εζληθή ρξενθνπία ηειηθά εκθαλίζηεθαλ ζε έλα θξάηνο ηεο Δπξσπαηθήο πεξηθέξεηαο, 
ηελ Διιάδα, αιιά ζχληνκα εμαπιψζεθε θαη ζε άιια Δπξσπαηθά θξάηε, 
αλάγθάδνληαο ηα θέληξα απνθάζεσλ λα πάξνπλ ηνικεξά θαη πνιιέο θνξέο αθξαία 
κέηξα γηα λα εκπνδίζνπλ ηελ κφιπλζε λα εμαπισζεί. 
Η εζληθή θξίζε κεηαδίδεηαη εθηφο ζπλφξσλ δηακέζνπ πνιιψλ θαλαιηψλ. ΢εκαληηθφ 
ξφιν παίδνπλ νη νηθνλνκηθνί δεζκνί κεηαμχ ησλ θξαηψλ θαη ηδηαίηεξα ε έθεζζε ησλ 
ηξαπεδψλ ζηα θξαηηθά νκφινγα. Μηα εζληθή θξίζε ρξένπο πνπ ζνβνχζε ζηελ Διιάδα 
ζα κεηαδηδφηαλ κε κεγαιχηεξε έληαζε ζην ηξαπεδηθφ ζχζηεκα ησλ άιισλ 
Δπξσπαηθψλ θξαηψλ, φζν πεξηζζφηεξν απηέο ήηαλ εθηεζεηκέλεο ζην Διιεληθφ ρξένο.  
Έρεη παξαηεξεζεί φηη κηα αχμεζε θαηά 1% ζην αζθάιηζηξν θηλδχλνπ ησλ Διιεληθψλ 
CDS, νδεγεί ζε αχμεζε θαηά 0,275% ζην αληίζηνηρν κέζν Δπξσπαηθφ, γεγνλφο πνπ 
ππνλλνεί ζεκαληηθφ βαζκφ κεηάδνζεο. Σα θαηλφκελα απηά είλαη έληνλα θαη νδεγνχλ 
ζε πην κφληκεο επηπηψζεηο ζε φια ηα θξάηε. 
Τπάξρνπλ δηάθνξνη ηχπνη νηθνλνκηθψλ δεζκψλ, φπσο ε έθζεζε ζην δεκφζην ρξένο 
θαη ν δηαηξαπεδηθφο δαλεηζκφο. Τπάξρνπλ έληνλεο ελδείμεηο φηη ε έθζεζε ζην δεκφζην 
ρξένο απνηειεί ζε φξνπο νηθνλνκηθνχο θαη ζηαηηζηηθνχο ζεκαληηθφ θαλάιη κεηάδνζεο 
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ηεο θξίζεο, ελψ ν δηαηξαπεδηθφο δαλεηζκφο δελ θαίλεηαη λα παίδεη ζηαηηζηηθά 
ζεκαληηθφ ξφιν.  
Όπσο έρνπκε αλαθέξεη, ε κφιπλζε δηαθξίλεηαη ζε ζεκειηψδε θαη κε ζεκειηψδε, κε ηε 
δεχηεξε λα εμαξηάηαη απφ παξάγνληεο πνπ δελ είλαη άκεζα αληρλεχζηκνη. Σέινο ε 
κεηάδνζε ηεο κφιπλζεο κπνξεί λα ζπκβεί, εάλ ε εκθάληζε ελφο ζνθ ζε έλα θξάηνο 
επεξξεάδεη ηηο εθηηκήζεηο ηεο αγνξάο φζνλ αθνξά ηηο πνιηηηθέο νηθνλνκηθήο θαη 
πνιηηηθήο ζπλεξγαζίαο. ΢ηελ πεξίπησζε ηνπ επξψ ζα ιέγακε φηη ηα λέα πνπ 
πξνέξρνληαλ απφ ηελ Διιάδα επηβεβαίσλαλ ηελ πεπνίζεζε ησλ επελδπηψλ φηη ηα 
ππφινηπα Δπξσπαηθά θξάηε ζα παξείραλ εγγπήζεηο γηα ην ρξένο ησλ αζζελέζηεξσλ 
θξαηψλ, ζπκβάιινληαο κε απηφλ ηνλ ηξφπν ζηελ πεξαηηέξσ εμάπισζε ηεο 
κφιπλζεο. 
Δίλαη γεληθψο απνδεθηφ φηη έλα ζνθ εζληθνχ ρξένπο ζε έλα θξάηνο αληαλαθιά έληνλα 
ζηα θξάηε απηά πνπ είλαη άκεζα εθηεζεηκέλα ζην ρξένο απηφ. Αληίζεηα ε ζρέζε 
κεηαμχ ησλ εκπνξηθψλ δεζκψλ θαη ζρέζεσλ δχν θξαηψλ θαη ηεο κεηάδνζεο ηεο 
θξίζεο κεηαμχ ηνπο παξακέλεη ζηαηηζηηθά πνιχ αζζελήο. Σαπηφρξνλα έλα ζεκαληηθφ 
κέξνο ηεο κεηάδνζεο ηεο θξίζεο δελ εξκελεχεηαη κε ηελ ππάξρνπζα ζεσξία, εηδηθά 
γηα ρψξεο φπσο ε Ιζπαλία θαη ε Πνξηνγαιία, γεγνλφο πνπ ππνδειψλεη φηη ππάξρνπλ 
θαη άιια θαλάιηα κεηάδνζεο ηεο θξίζεο, εθηφο απ΄ απηά πνπ γλσξίδνπκε. 
Όπσο είλαη θπζηθφ, φζν πην επάισηε είλαη κηα νηθνλνκία, ηφζν πην κεγάινο είλαη ν 
βαζκφο κεηάδνζεο ηεο Διιεληθήο θξίζεο. Δηδηθά νη ηξάπεδεο ζε πην επάισηεο ρψξεο 
αληαπνθξίλνληαη πην έληνλα ζηα ζνθ πνπ πξνέξρνληαη απφ ηελ Διιάδα. ΢ηελ 
πεξίπησζε δε πνπ νη ζπγθεθξηκέλεο ρψξεο εκπιέθνληαη ζην κεραληζκφ ζηήξημεο ηεο 
Διιάδαο, ηφηε νη απψιεηέο ηνπο απφ Διιεληθνχο ηίηινπο είλαη αθφκε βαζχηεξεο. Καη 
βέβαηα ππάξρνπλ θαη νη έκεζνη ηξφπνη κεηάδνζεο ηεο θξίζεο. Γηα παξάδεηγκα εάλ ε 
Γαιιία είλαη εθηεζεηκέλε ζην Διιεληθφ ρξένο ελψ ε Ιζπαλία φρη, εληνχηνηο ε θξίζε 
κεηαδίδεηαη θαη ζηελ Ιζπαλία, ιφγσ ηεο έθζεζεο ησλ Ιζπαληθψλ ηξαπεδψλ ζηηο 
Γαιιηθέο. 
Σα διεθνή κανάλια ηπαπεζικού δανειζμού, ηην πεπίοδο ηηρ κπίζηρ. 
Σν πεξηβάιινλ πνπ ραξαθηεξίδεη κηα νηθνλνκηθή θξίζε είλαη απηφ ηνπ θφβνπ, ηεο 
αβεβαηφηεηαο θαη ηνπ παληθνχ. Γηα κηα ηξάπεδα ζην δηεζλέο πεδίν απηφ κεηαθξάδεηαη 
ζε πςειή αβεβαηφηεηα ζηα ζηνηρεία ηνπ ελεξγεηηθνχ ηεο, έληνλε δηαθχκαλζε ζηελ 
πξφζβαζή ηεο ζηε δηαηξαπεδηθή αγνξά ξεπζηφηεηαο θαη ππνβάζκηζε ηεο 
αμηνιφγεζεο θαη ηεο θεξεγγπφηεηαο ηεο. Απηά ηα ηξία θαλάιηα  – ηεο αβεβαηφηεηαο, 
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ηεο ξεπζηφηεηαο θαη ηεο θεξεγγπφηεηαο – αληαλαθινχλ κε ηε ζεηξά ηνπο ηε ξνή ηεο 
ρξεκαηνδφηεζεο ησλ νηθνλνκηψλ. Γηα ην ιφγν απηφ είλαη θξίζηκν λα εμεηάζνπκε ηνπο 
ηξφπνπο κε ηνπο νπνίνπο ηα ηξία απηά θαλάιηα, ζε δηεζλέο επίπεδν, επεξξεάδνπλ 
ηνλ δηαηξαπεδηθφ δαλεηζκφ απφ ηα αλεπηπγκέλα θξάηε πξνο ηα αλαπηπζζφκελα θαηά 
ηε δηάξθεηα ηεο θξίζεο ηνπ 2007-2009. 
Γηα παξάδεηγκα, εάλ ε πξφζβαζε ζε ξεπζηφηεηα είλαη πεξηνξηζκέλε, ηφηε ε εγρψξηα 
θεληξηθή ηξάπεδα κπνξεί λα ραιαξψζεη ηνπο πεξηνξηζκνχο ηεο ή λα πξνβεί ζε 
ζπκθσλίεο αληαιιαγήο ζπλαιιάγκαηνο πξνθεηκέλνπ λα παξέρεη ζηηο εκπνξηθέο 
ηξάπεδεο ηελ απαξαίηεηε ξεπζηφηεηα (last resort lending). Αληηζέησο εάλ ην 
πξφβιεκα είλαη θεξεγγπφηεηαο ηφηε ε πνιηηηθή θαη νη ξπζκίζεηο ηεο θεληξηθήο 
ηξάπεδαο ζα είλαη πξνο ηελ θαηεχζπλζε ηεο κείσζεο ησλ κε εμππεξεηνχκελσλ 
δαλείσλ.  
Σα πεξηζζφηεξα επξήκαηα θαηαηείλνπλ ζην γεγνλφο φηη θαηά ηε δηάξθεηα ηεο θξίζεο, 
ηα πξνβιήκαηα ξεπζηφηεηαο ησλ ηξαπεδψλ θαζψο θαη ηεο αβεβαηφηεηαο ήηαλ ηα 
θπξηφηεξα θαλάιηα κέζσ ησλ νπνίσλ επεξξεάζηεθε ν δαλεηζκφο ησλ ηξαπεδψλ απφ 
ηα αλεπηπγκέλα πξνο ηα αλαπηπζζφκελα θξάηε. Πεξαηηέξσ ε επαηζζεζία ησλ 
ηξαπεδψλ ζε απηνχο ηνπο παξάγνληεο δελ θάλεθε λα αιιάδεη θαηά ηε δηάξθεηα ηεο 
θξίζεο. Η επίδξαζε ηεο θξίζεο ζηνλ δαλεηζκφ ησλ ηξαπεδψλ ήηαλ κηα αλακελφκελε 
αληίδξαζε ζηηο αιιαγέο πνπ επήιζαλ ζηελ δηαηξαπεδηθή ξεπζηφηεηα θαη ηελ 
νηθνλνκηθή αβεβαηφηεηα, παξά ζηελ αιιαγή ηεο ηθαλφηεηαο πξφζβαζεο ησλ 
ηξαπεδψλ ζηα δηαζέζηκα θεθάιαηα. Πάλησο νη Δπξσπαηθέο ηξάπεδεο θαίλεηαη λα 
είλαη πην επαίζζεηεο ζηηο ζπλζήθεο ηεο αγνξάο, ηα ρξφληα πνπ ε θξίζε ήηαλ ζην 
απνθνξχθσκά ηεο, ζε ζρέζε κε απηέο ζηηο Ηλσκέλεο Πνιηηείεο. 
΢εκαληηθφ ξφιν παίδεη ε παξνπζία μέλσλ ηξαπεδψλ ζηελ ρξεκαηνδφηεζε ηεο 
νηθνλνκίαο, ηδηαίηεξα ζηηο αλαπηπζζφκελεο αγνξέο, φπσο ζηελ Λαηηληθή Ακεξηθή ή 
ζηηο Ιλδίεο, φπνπ ε πξφζβαζε ζε πίζησζε θαη ζε θεθάιαηα ηφζν ησλ κηθξψλ φζν θαη 
ησλ κεγαιπηέξσλ επηρεηξήζεσλ είλαη ηδηαίηεξα ζεκαληηθή. Οη μέλεο ηξάπεδεο 
επέδεημαλ κηα κεγαιχηεξε ηθαλφηεηα λα δηαηεξήζνπλ ηελ πηζηνιεπηηθή ηνπο 
ηθαλφηεηα, ζε ζρέζε κε ηηο εγρψξηεο, θαηά ηε δηάξθεηα ηεο θξίζεο. 
΢ε ζπλζήθεο πηζησηηθνχ πεξηνξηζκνχ δεκηνπξγείηαη έλα ράζκα κεηαμχ ηνπ θφζηνπο 
ησλ εμσηεξηθψλ θεθαιαίσλ πνπ κπνξεί λα δαλεηζηεί κηα ηξάπεδα θαη ηνπ θφζηνπο 
ησλ εζσηεξηθψλ θεθαιαίσλ επθαηξίαο. Καηά ηε δηάξθεηα κηαο νηθνλνκηθήο θξίζεο ην 
θφζηνο ησλ δηαζέζηκσλ θεθαιαίσλ απμάλεηαη, κε απνηέιεζκα, φζν πην κεγάιε είλαη 
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απηή ε δηαθνξά ηφζν πην δχζθνιε είλαη ε δπλαηφηεηα δαλεηζκνχ, κεηψλνληαο έηζη ηα 
πνζά πνπ κηα ηξάπεδα κπνξεί λα δαλεηζηεί. Σν θαηλφκελν απηφ ιέγεηαη θξίζε 
ξεπζηφηεηαο θαη είλαη έλα απφ ηα ηξία ζεκαληηθά θαλάιηα κεηάδνζεο ηεο θξίζεο ησλ 
ηξαπεδψλ.  
Έλαο άιινο ηξφπνο κε ηνλ νπνίν επεξεάδεηαη ν ηξαπεδηθφο δαλεηζκφο, είλαη ε 
επηδείλσζε ησλ ηζνινγηζκψλ ησλ ηξαπεδψλ, ιφγσ ηεο θξίζεο. Απηφ κε ηε ζεηξά ηνπ 
νδεγεί ζηελ αχμεζε ηνπ θφζηνπο ησλ δαλεηδφκελσλ θεθαιαίσλ, θαζψο ε 
πηζηνιεηπηθή ηθαλφηεηα ησλ ηξαπεδψλ ππνρσξεί δηεζλψο. Έλα πςειφηεξν επηηφθην 
δαλεηζκνχ κεηψλεη ηελ θαζαξή αμία ηεο ηξάπεδαο, κε ζπλέπεηα ηελ αθφκε πην 
δχζθνιε πξφζβαζε ζηα θεθάιαηα παγθνζκίσο. Σν θαηλφκελν απηφ θαιείηαη θξίζε 
θεξεγγπφηεηαο ή πηζηνιεπηηθή θξίζε θαη απνηειεί έλα εμίζνπ ζεκαληηθφ θαλάιη 
κεηάδνζεο ηεο ηξαπεδηθήο θξίζεο. 
Σέινο, ε γεληθφηεξε αβεβαηφηεηα θαη ε αηειήο πιεξνθφξεζε έρνπλ ζαλ απνηέιεζκα 
νη ηξάπεδεο λα κελ είλαη ζσξαθηζκέλεο απέλαληη ζηνλ πηζησηηθφ θίλδπλν. Η αχμεζε 
ησλ επηηνθίσλ ζηα δάλεηα πνπ έρνπλ ρνξεγήζεη δελ αξθεί λα ηηο πξνζηαηέςεη 
απέλαληη ζηνπο ζηξαηεγηθνχο θαθνπιεξσηέο, ελψ ηα αλακελφκελα θέξδε ηνπο είλαη 
ζεκαληηθά ρακειφηεξα. Η κείσζε ηεο θεξδνθνξίαο ηνπο, ιφγσ ηεο αχμεζεο ηεο 
αβεβαηφηεηαο, έρεη θη απηή ζαλ απνηέιεζκα ηελ αλάγθε γηα κεγαιχηεξν δαλεηζκφ κε 
δπζκελέζηεξνπο φξνπο, ζπκβάινληαο κε ηε ζεηξά ηεο ζηελ δηάδνζε ηεο θξίζεο, 
κέζσ ηεο γεληθφηεξεο αβεβαηφηεηαο. 
Η γεωγπαθία ηηρ κπίζηρ. 
Σελ ηειεπηαία δεθαεηία κεγάιε ζπδήηεζε έρεη γίλεη ζρεηηθά κε ηελ ηθαλφηεηα ησλ 
δηαθφξσλ νηθνλνκηθψλ παξαγφλησλ λα ζηακαηήζνπλ ηε δηάδνζε ηεο θξίζεο εληφο 
ησλ ζπλφξσλ. Δθηφο απφ ηηο ηξάπεδεο ηδαίηεξε πξνζνρή έρεη δνζεί ζηελ παγθφζκηα 
αγνξά θεθαιαίσλ, θαζψο πιένλ ζεσξείηαη ζεκαληηθφο παξάγσλ κεηάδνζεο ηεο 
κφιπλζεο. Παξαηεξνχληαη έληνλα θαηλφκελα δηαθνξνπνίεζεο ζηε κεηάδνζε ηεο 
θξίζεο, αιιά θαη ζην βαζκφ αλάθακςεο, γηα δηάθνξεο ρψξεο θαη δηάθνξεο 
νηθνλνκίεο. 
Σν εξψηεκα πνπ εγείξεηαη είλαη: Πνηά είλαη ε γεσγξαθία ηεο κεηάδνζεο ηεο θξίζεο; 
Πνχ κεηαδίδεηαη ε κφιπλζε; Παξφιν πνπ νη κέρξη ηψξα έξεπλεο ππνδεηθλχνπλ ηηο 
αλαπηπζζζφκελεο ρψξεο λα είλαη πην επάισηεο ζηελ κφιπλζε, εληνχηνηο πξφζθαηα 
επξήκαηα θαλεξψλνπλ φηη δελ είλαη πάληα ζαθέο πνηεο νηθνλνκίεο επεξεάδνληαη 
πεξηζζφηεξν. Σα πεξηζζφηεξα θξάηε θαίλεηαη λα βξίζθνληαη ζε κηα δπλακηθή 
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ηζνξξνπία κεηαμχ ηνπο, φζνλ αθνξά ζηηο κεηνρηθέο θαη νκνινγηαθέο ξνέο, 
ζπκπεξηιακβαλνκέλσλ θαη ησλ αλεπηπγκέλσλ νηθνλνκηψλ. 
Δπίζεο ηα θαηλφκελα νηθνλνκηθήο αιιειεπίδξαζεο θαη κεηάδνζεο ηφζν ησλ 
αξλεηηθψλ, φζν θαη ησλ ζεηηθψλ ζνθ παξαηεξνχληαη ηαπηφρξνλα ζηηο αγνξέο 
κεηνρψλ θαη νκνιφγσλ. Παξφιν πνπ ηα θχκαηα απηά ζπληνληζκνχ έρνπλ ηελ 
αθεηεξία ηνπο ζηηο αλεπηπγκέλεο νηθνλνκίεο, ηειηθά ε ρξεκαηνδφηεζε ησλ ιηγφηεξν 
αλεπηπγκέλσλ θξαηψλ θαίλεηαη λα επεξεάδεηαη πεξηζζφηεξν απφ ηελ θξίζε. 
Σέινο ηδηαίηεξα ζεκαληηθφ ξφιν ζηελ εμάπισζε ηεο θξίζεο παίδνπλ ην επίπεδν ηνπ 
πνιηηηθνχ ξίζθνπ, ηεο ρψξαο πνπ εθδίδεη ην ρξένο, θαζψο θαη ε απφζηαζε κεηαμχ 
ηνπ εθδφηε θαη ηνπ απνδέθηε. Όζν κεγαιχηεξν είλα ην πνιηηηθφ ξίζθν θαη ε 
απφζηαζε, ηφζν νη επελδπηέο έρνπλ ηελ ηάζε λα κεηψλνπλ ηελ έθζεζή ηνπο ζην 
ζπγθεθξηκέλν ρξένο. 
Γηαηί είλαη φκσο κεξηθέο ρψξεο πην επαίζζεηεο ζηελ κεηάδνζε ηεο παγθφζκηαο θξίζεο 
απφ άιιεο; Με άιια ιφγηα ηη είλαη απηφ πνπ θάλεη ηνπο επελδπηέο αλππφκνλνπο λα 
εηζέιζνπλ (ή λα εμέιζνπλ) ζε κία ρψξα, φηαλ νη ζπλζήθεο βειηηψλνληαη (ή 
ρεηξνηεξεχνπλ αληίζηνηρα); Δπηά είλαη νη παξάγνληεο πνπ θαζνξίδνπλ απηή ηελ 
ζπκπεξηθνξά: 
1. Σν λνκνζεηηθφ πιαίζην θαη ε πξνζηαζία ησλ επελδπηψλ 
2. Η πνιηηηθή ζηαζεξφηεηα ηεο ρψξαο 
3. Η δηαθάλεηα, ε ζσζηή δηαθπβέξλεζε θαη ε ινγνδνζία ζε εηαηξηθφ επίπεδν 
4. Η αζθάιεηα ησλ θεθαιαίσλ 
5. Η ειαρηζηνπνίεζε ηνπ νηθνλνκηθνχ ξίζθνπ 
6. Οη δεκφζηεο επελδχζεηο 
7. Η απφζηαζε 
Έρεη ζεκαζία λα εμεηάζνπκε εάλ νη θηλήζεηο θεθαιαίσλ ζε παγθφζκην επίπεδν 
νθείινληαη ζε εμσηεξηθνχο παξάγνληεο πνπ «ζπξψρλνπλ» ηνπο επελδπηέο πξνο ηα 
έμσ ή ζε εζσηεξηθνχο παξάγνληεο πνπ ηνπο ηξαβνχλ πξνο ηα «κέζα». ΢πγθεθξηκέλα 
ην πηεζηηθφ ρξεκαηννηθνλνκηθφ ηνπίν, ηα καθξννηθνλνκηθά λέα θαη ην επίπεδν ησλ 
επηηνθίσλ ζηηο αλεπηπγκέλεο αγνξέο, ιεηηνπξγνχλ σο παξάγνληεο πίεζεο πνπ σζνχλ 
ηνπο δηεζλείο επελδπηέο λα απμήζνπλ ηελ έθζεζή ηνπο πξνο δηεζλείο αγνξέο. 
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Αληίζεηα παξάγνληεο φπσο ε πνιηηηθή ζηαζεξφηεηα θαη ε απφζηαζε δξνπλ σο 
ειθηηθνί παξάγνληεο ψζηε νη επελδπηέο λα παξακείλνπλ ζην εζσηεξηθφ ηεο ρψξαο. 
΢πκπεξαζκαηηθά ζα ιέγακε φηη ππάξρνπλ ηζρπξέο ελδείμεηο γηα ηελ εμάπισζε ηεο 
θξίζεο παγθνζκίσο. Όηαλ νη ζπλζήθεο ηεο νηθνλνκίαο ζηηο αλεπηπγκέλεο αγνξέο 
αιιάδνπλ, ε ρξεκαηνδφηεζε ησλ αλαπηπζφκελσλ αγνξψλ γίλεηαη δπζρεξήο. ΢ε 
γεληθέο γξακκέο νη θπγφθεληξεο δπλάκεηο πνπ νδεγνχλ ηνπο επελδπηέο ζηηο 
αλεπηπγκέλεο αγνξέο θαηά ηε δηάξθεηα ηεο θξίζεο, έρνπλ άκεζν αληίθηππν ζηηο 
αλαπηπζζφκελεο ρψξεο. Η έλλνηα ηεο κεηάδνζεο ηεο κφιπλζεο έρεη λα θάλεη κε ηε 
δνκή απηήο θαζαπηήο ηεο βηνκεραλίαο ηεο νηθνλνκίαο. Γηα παξάδεηγκα, ν βαζκφο ηεο 
κεηάδνζεο ηεο θξίζεο παγθνζκίσο, ζρεηίδεηαη άξξεθηα κε ηα πξνζθάησο 
εκθαληδφκελα «παγθφζκηα θεθάιαηα» πνπ  επελδχνπλ ηαπηφρξνλα ζε αλεπηπγκέλεο 
νηθνλνκίεο, αιιά θαη ζε αλεπηπζζφκελεο αγνξέο. Σέινο, θαίλεηαη φηη ζηηο αγνξέο 
κεηνρψλ παγθνζκίσο, ππεξηεξνχλ ηα θεθάιαηα απφ πεξηθεξεηαθά θξάηε, ελψ ζηηο 
αληίζηνηρεο αγνξέο νκνιφγσλ θαίλεηαη λα ππάξρεη κηα δηαρσξηζηηθή γξακκή: Σν 
ζχλνιν ησλ θεθαιαίσλ επελδχεηαη είηε ζε αλαπηπζζφκελεο αγνξέο (high-yield bond 
funds), είηε ζε αλεπηπγκέλεο νηθνλνκίεο (low-yield bond funds). Σν γεγνλφο απηφ 
ππνλλνεί φηη νη managers θαη νη δηαρεηξηζηέο κεγάισλ ραξηνθπιαθίσλ πξνβιέπνπλ 
θαη πξνεμνθινχλ πξνο πνηα θαηεχζπλζε ζα θηλεζεί ε θξίζε, ηνπνζεηψληαο αλάινγα 
ηα θεθάιαηά ηνπο. 
΢ςμπεπάζμαηα από ηην αγοπά Ελληνικών κπαηικών ομολόγων. 
Απφ ηελ πηνζέηεζε ηνπ θνηλνχ λνκίζκαηνο, ηνπ επξψ (European Monetary Union 
EMU), ηα θξάηε κέιε ηεο λνκηζκαηηθήο έλσζεο απνιακβάλνπλ κηα ζχγθιηζε ζηα 
καθξνπξφζεζκα επηηφθηά ηνπο. Γεκηνπξγήζεθαλ κεγάιεο πξνζδνθίεο ζηα θξάηε ηεο 
πεξηθέξεηαο, φπσο ε Διιάδα, ε Πνξηνγαιία θαη ε Ιξιαλδία γηα βηψζηκε νηθνλνκηθή 
αλάπηπμε, ιφγσ ηεο πνιηηηθήο θαη νηθνλνκηθήο ζηαζεξφηεηαο, ηελ νπνία ην θνηλφ 
λφκηζκα εγγπφηαλ. Η θνηλή λνκηζκαηηθή πνιηηηθή πεξηειάκβαλε πνιχ ρακειά επηηφθηα 
πνπ θαζφξηδε ε Κεληξηθή Δπξσπαηθή Σξάπεδα (ECB), ηα νπνία κε ηε ζεηξά ηνπο ζα 
βαζίδνληαλ ζηα πνιχ ρακειά επίπεδα πιεζσξηζκνχ ζηελ Γεξκαλία. Έηζη νη ρψξεο 
κε πςειά επίπεδα πιεζσξηζκνχ εθείλε ηελ επνρή, φπσο ε Διιάδα, ε Πνξηνγαιιία 
θαη άιιεο επσθειήζεθαλ ζηνλ ηνκέα ηεο αμηνπηζηίαο. Ωζηφζν ε ραιαξή λνκηζκαηηθή 
πνιηηηθή δελ επέηξεςε ζηηο ρψξεο απηέο λα ζπγθιίλνπλ ηα επίπεδα ησλ 
πιεζσξηζκψλ ηνπο κε ην κέζν φξν ηεο Δπξσδψλεο. Σν γεγνλφο απηφ είρε ζαλ 
απνηέιεζκα ηελ έιιεηςε αληαγσληζηηθφηεηαο θαη ηελ επηδείλσζε ησλ 
δεκνζηνλνκηθψλ ηνπο ειιεηκάησλ. 
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Σν 2007 κεηά ηελ έθξεμε ηεο θνχζθαο ησλ ζηεγαζηηθψλ δαλείσλ πςεινχ ξίζθνπ 
ζηελ αγνξά ησλ Ηλσκέλσλ Πνιηηεηψλ, ηα καθξνπξφζεζκα επηηφθηα απμήζεθαλ 
παγθνζκίσο. Πνιινί νηθνλνκνιφγνη πηζηεχνπλ φηη ηα ζεκειηψδε καθξννηθνλνκηθά 
δεδνκέλα ηεο θάζε ρψξαο ρσξηζηά, ήηαλ ππεχζπλα γηα απηήλ ηελ αχμεζε. Αληηζέησο 
άιινη πηζηεχνπλ φηη ε αχμεζε ζηε δηαθχκαλζε ησλ Δπξσπαηθψλ θξαηηθψλ νκνιφγσλ 
ήηαλ απφηέιεζκα ηεο δηάδνζεο ηεο κφιπλζεο απφ ηελ θξίζε ζηελ Διιάδα. Η Διιάδα 
ήηαλ ε πξψηε ρψξα πνπ δήηεζε νηθνλνκηθή βνήζεηα απφ ηελ Δπξσπαηθή Έλσζε θαη 
ην Γηεζλέο Ννκηζκαηηθφ Σακείν, ηνλ Μαίν ηνπ 2010. Σα δηπιά ειιείκαηα ηεο Διιάδαο, 
ηφζν ην δεκνζηνλνκηθφ, φζν θαη ην πνιχ πςειφ ρξένο, σο πνζνζηφ ηνπ ΑΔΠ, ήηαλ 
ηα θχξηα ζηνηρεία πνπ απαζρνινχζαλ ηε δηεζλή νηθνλνκηθή θνηλφηεηα, ζρεηηθά κε ηε 
κεηάδνζε ηεο θξίζεο ζηα ππφινηπα Δπξσπαηθά θξάηε. 
Τπάξρνπλ δηάθνξνη νξηζκνί ηεο κεηάδνζεο ηεο θξίζεο ζηε δηεζλή βηβιηνγξαθία 
θαζψο θαη πνιινί νηθνλνκεηξηθνί κέζνδνη γηα ηνλ εληνπηζκφ ηεο. Οξίδνπκε ηελ 
κεηάδνζε ηεο θξίζεο σο ηελ απνπζία ηνπ γξακκηθνχ κεραληζκνχ κεηάδνζεο ησλ 
κεηαβνιψλ ζηηο δηαθπκάλζεηο, θαζψο θαη ηελ πηζαλφηεηα κεγηζηνπνίεζεο ηεο 
ζπλδηαθχκαλζεο κεηαμχ δχν ρσξψλ. 
΢χκθσλα κε ηελ Παγθφζκηα Σξάπεδα, ε κεηάδνζε ηεο θξίζεο ζπκβαηλεη φηαλ νη 
ζπλδηαθπκάλζεηο κεηαμχ ησλ θξαηψλ θαηά ηε δηάξθεηα ηεο θξίζεο απμάλνληαη ζε 
ζρέζε κε ηηο αληίζηνηρεο ζπλδηαθπκάλζεηο ηνλ ππφινηπν θαηξφ. 
Σα απνηειέζκαηα ησλ εξεπλψλ δελ επηβεβαηψλνπλ ηελ ππφζεζε ηεο κεηάδνζεο ηεο 
θξίζεο ησλ δεθαεηψλ Διιεληθψλ νκνιφγσλ είηε πξνο ηα θξάηε ηεο πεξηθέξεηαο, είηε 
πξνο ηνλ ππξήλα ηεο Δπξσδψλεο. Αληηζέησο ππάξρεη απνζχλδεζε ζηελ 
ζπλδηαθχκαλζε κεηαμχ ησλ απνδφζεσλ ησλ PIIGs (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece 
and Spain) κε ηνλ ππξήλα ησλ θξαηψλ ηεο Δπξσδψλεο. Σα επξήκαηα απηά είλαη ζε 
πιήξε επζπγξάκκηζε κε πξνεγνχκελα επξήκαηα, πσο πξψηε θνξά απφ ηελ 
πηνζέηεζε ηνπ θνηλνχ λνκίζκαηνο, νη εηδηθνί ησλ αγνξψλ ιάκβαλαλ ππφςε ηα 
καθξννηθνλνκηθά κεγέζε θάζε θξάηνπο γηα λα αλαιχνπλ θαη λα εθηηκνχλ ην ρξένο 
θάζε ρψξαο μερσξηζηά. 
Η ζσέζη μεηαξύ ηηρ μείωζηρ ηων επενδύζεων και ηηρ αύξηζηρ ηηρ ανεπγίαρ 
ζηην ζώνη ηος Εςπώ 
Έλα άθξσο αλεζπρεηηθφ ζηνηρείν ηεο Δπξσδψλεο είλαη ε θαηαθφξπθε πηψζε ηεο 
επελδπηηθήο δξαζηεξηφηεηαο. Σν χςνο ησλ επελδχζεσλ, ζαλ πνζνζηφ ηνπ 
αθαζάξηζηνπ πξντφληνο ησλ νηθνλνκηψλ ηνπ ππξήλα ηεο Δπξψδψλεο, παξνπζηάδεη 
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κείσζε ηεο ηάμεο ηνπ 20% ζε ζρέζε κε ην 2007, ηε ρξνληά πξηλ ηελ έθξεμε ηεο 
παγθφζκηαο νηθνλνκηθήο θξίζεο. Αληίζεηα, ε επελδπηηθή δξαζηεξηφηεηα ζε άιιεο 
νηθνλνκίεο φπσο απηή ησλ ΗΠΑ, ηεο Ιαπσλίαο ή ησλ εθηφο Δπξψ θξαηψλ έρεη 
ζηαζεξά, απφ ην 2010 θη έπεηηα, επαλέιζεη ζηα πξν θξίζεο επίπεδα. Σν γεγνλφο φηη 
ην επίπεδν επέλδπζεο, σο πνζνζηφ ηνπ ΑΔΠ, θζίλεη ζηα θξάηε ηεο Δπξσδψλεο, κε 
εμαίξεζε ηελ πεξίπησζε ηεο Γεξκαλίαο, φπνπ ην επίπεδν ηεο επέλδπζεο έρεη ζρεδφλ 
αλαθηήζεη ηηο πξν θξίζεο ηηκέο ηνπ, θαλεξψλεη φηη ε έληαζε ηεο επελδπηηθήο 
δξαζηεξηφηεηαο δηαθέξεη αθφκα θαη κέζα ζηνπο θφιπνπο ηνπ Δπξψ. 
Παξ΄ φιε ηε ζεκαζία ηεο, νη Δπξσπαίνη αμησκαηνχρνη δελ αληηιεθζεθαλ ηελ έθηαζε 
ηεο ππνεπέλδπζεο ζηε δψλε ηνπ Δπξψ. ΢ηελ πξνζπάζεηά ηνπο λα αληηκεησπίζνπλ 
ηελ θξίζε ρξένπο, έξημαλ φιν ην βάξνο ζηελ δεκνζηνλνκηθή ζπκκφξθσζε ησλ 
θξαηψλ κειψλ, ζαλ ηελ κνλαδηθή πξνυπφζεζε γηα ηελ επηζηξνθή ζηελ αλάπηπμε. 
Παξά φκσο ηελ δεκνζηνλνκηθή πξφνδν πνπ επεηεχρζε θαη ηελ λνκηζκαηηθή 
ραιάξσζε πνπ πξνζέθεξε ε Κεληξηθή Δπξσπατθή Σξάπεδα (ECB), ε φπνηα 
αλάπηπμε παξέκελε ζνιή θαη αλαηκηθή, γεγνλφο πνπ έζηξεςε ηα θψηα ηνπ 
ελδηαθέξνληνο ζηε ζεκαζία ηεο ππνεπέλδπζεο ζηελ πεξηνρή ηνπ Δπξψ. 
Πνιινί εξεπλεηέο ππνζηεξίδνπλ φηη ε επελδπηηθή δξαζηεξηφηεηα ζηε δψλε ηνπ Δπξψ 
πζηεξνχζε, ζε ζρέζε κε άιιεο αλεπηπγκέλεο νηθνλνκίεο, πξηλ ηελ νηθνλνκηθή θξίζε. 
Δθηηκνχλ φηη πξνθεηκέλνπ λα παξακείλεη ε Δπξσδψλε ζην επίπεδν ησλ άιισλ 
αλεπηπγκέλσλ νηθνλνκηψλ, ζα έπξεπε λα επελδχζεη πάλσ απφ € 7,5 
ηξηζεθαηνκκχξηα, ηελ πεξίνδν 1999 – 2007. Αληί φκσο ην ράζκα λα θιείζεη, απηφ 
κεγάισζε θη άιιν. Η θαηάξξεπζε ηεο επελδπηηθήο δξαζηεξηφηεηαο είλαη πην 
αλεζπρεηηθή ζηηο ρψξεο πνπ καζηίδνληαη απφ ηελ θξίζε ρξένπο, ζηελ πεξηθέξεηα ηνπ 
Δπξψ, ζαλ απνηέιεζκα ηεο δξακαηηθήο κείσζεο ηεο δήηεζεο θαη ησλ 
εκπξνζζνβαξψλ δεκνζηνλνκηθψλ κέηξσλ. Δπηπξφζζεηα νη θνηλσληθέο εληάζεηο, απφ 
ηα κέηξα ιηηφηεηαο, δεκηνπξγνχλ έλα πνιηηηθφ θαη νηθνλνκηθφ πεξηβάιινλ, πνπ 
καηαηψλεη ηα φπνηα επελδπηηθά πιάλα.  
Σελ ίδηα ψξα, κηα πξσηνθαλήο αχμεζε ηεο αλεξγίαο καζηίδεη ηε δψλε ηνπ Δπξψ. ΢ε 
ζρέζε κε ηηο ππφινηπεο αλέπηπγκέλεο νηθνλνκίεο, ε Δπξσδψλε, εθηφο απφ ηε 
Γεξκαλία φπνπ ε αλεξγία παξνπζηάδεη κείσζε, είλαη ε κφλε νηθνλνκία φπνπ ε 
αλεξγία έρεη μεπεξάζεη ηα πξν θξίζεο επίπεδα, ην πνζνζηφ ηεο παξακέλεη δηςήθην 
θαη ζπλερίδεη λα απμάλεηαη. 
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Κξίλνληαο απφ ηα απνηειέζκαηα ζηελ αλεξγία θαη ηεο θαηαλνκήο ησλ θαζαξψλ 
θεθαιαίσλ ηελ πεξίνδν 1991 – 2015 αλαδεηθλχεηαη εληππσζηαθά ην θαηλφκελν ηνπ 
θαηφπηξνπ: ππάξρεη κηα έληνλα αξλεηηθή ζπζρέηηζε κεηαμχ ηεο αλεξγίαο θαη ηεο 
νιηθήο επέλδπζεο, ηφζν ηεο ηδησηηθήο φζν θαη ηεο δεκφζηαο. 
Η ζρέζε κεηαμχ ηνπ επελδεδπκέλνπ θεθαιαίνπ θαη ηεο αλεξγίαο ηξηβήο έρεη εθηελψο 
κειεηεζεί ηηο ηειεπηαίεο δχν δεθαεηίεο, θαζψο έρεη απνηειέζεη πεδίν έληνλεο 
αληηπαξάζεζεο, κεηαμχ ησλ νηθνλνκνιφγσλ. Η αλεξγία ηξηβήο απμάλεηαη κε ηελ ηζρχ 
ησλ ζπλδηθάησλ θαη ηα επηδφκαηα αλεξγίαο, κεηψλεηαη κε ηελ αληαγσληζηηθφηεηα ηεο 
νηθνλνκίαο, αιιά δελ επεξεάδεηαη απφ ηηο κεηαβνιέο ζην θιάζκα έληαζεο θεθαιαίνπ 
- έληαζεο εξγαζίαο. Η ππφζεζε είλαη φηη νη πνιηηηθέο αχμεζεο ηεο έληαζεο θεθαιαίνπ, 
είλαη εληειψο αλαπνηειεζκαηηθέο ζρεηηθά κε ηα πςειά πνζνζηά αλεξγίαο θαη κφλν ε 
εθαξκνγή κεηαξξπζκίζεσλ ζηελ αγνξά εξγαζίαο ζα κπνξνχζε λα ηα ξίμεη 
καθξνπξφζεζκα. 
Η αιιειεπίδξαζε κεηαμχ επέλδπζεο θαη αλεξγίαο απνηέιεζε αληηθείκελν 
επηζηεκνληθήο δηακάρεο θαη ζηηο ΗΠΑ. Ο Taylor (2011) δηεηχπσζε κηα ηζρπξά 
αξλεηηθή ζρέζε κεηαμχ ηνπο θαη ππνζηήξημε φηη « νη πξνζπάζεηεο  ηεο θπβέξλεζεο 
λα κεηψζνπλ ηελ αλεξγία ζα πξέπεη λα ελζαξξχλνπλ ηε δεκηνπξγία θαη ηελ επέθηαζε 
ηεο επαγγεικαηηθήο δξαζηεξηφηεηαο». Αληίζεηα ν Krugman (2014) ππνζηήξημε φηη ηα 
επξήκαηα είλαη πιαζηά, ιφγσ ηεο εθξεθηηθήο αχμεζεο ηεο αζηηθήο επέλδπζεο, κεηά 
ηελ παγθφζκηα θξίζε θαη δηαβεβαίσζε φηη ε πςειή αλεξγία είλαη απηή πνπ νδεγεί ζε 
ηνπνζεηήζεηο θεθαιαίνπ θαη φρη ην αληίζεην. Πνιχ ζπρλά ε δηακάρε απηή 
εκπινπηίδεηαη κε ζεσξεηηθά ή ηδενινγηθά επηρεηξήκαηα, πάλησο είλαη πνιχ ζεκαληηθφ 
λα εμαθξηβψζνπκε εάλ θαη ζε πνην βαζκφ ην πνζνζηφ αλεξγίαο εμαξηάηαη απφ ηελ 
επελδπηηθή δξαζηεξηφηεηα. 
Η αλεξγία ηξηβήο επεξξεάδεηαη απφ ηελ επέλδπζε θεθαιαίνπ, απφ ηε ζηηγκή πνπ 
ππάξρεη ειαζηηθφηεηα κεηαμχ θεθαιαίνπ θαη εξγαζίαο. ΢ηε δψλε ηνπ Δπξψ ην 
επίπεδν ησλ κηζζψλ δελ έρεη παξακείλεη ζηαζεξφ ηηο ηειεπηαίεο δχν δεθαεηίεο θη έηζη 
ε επίδξαζε ηεο επέλδπζεο ζην πνζνζηφ αλεξγίαο αλακέλεηαη ηζρπξή. Μηα δηαθξαηηθή 
εθηίκεζε ησλ πνζνζηψλ αλεξγίαο, εκθαλίδεη ηελ επίδξαζε ηεο επέλδπζεο λα είλαη 
ζηαηηζηηθά ζεκαληηθή, ζε αληίζεζε κε ηηο εξγαζηαθέο κεηαξξπζκίζεηο πνπ δελ παίδνπλ 
ζεκαληηθφ ξφιν ζηελ πξνψζεζε ηεο απαζρφιεζεο. Οη εθηηκήζεηο ρξεζηκεχνπλ γηα 
λα ππνινγίζνπκε ην επελδπηηθφ θελφ ζηελ Δπξσδψλε θαη ζε πνην πνζνζηφ ζα 
πξέπεη λα ζπκκεηέρνπλ ν ηδησηηθφο θαη ν δεκφζηνο ηνκέαο ζηελ απνθαηάζηαζε ηεο 
απαζρφιεζεο. 
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Ο πόλορ ηηρ πολιηικήρ διαθθοπάρ και ηηρ θοποδιαθςγήρ ζηην Ελληνική 
ηπαγωδία.  
Η δηαθζνξά θαζψο θαη ε θαηαζπαηάιεζε ησλ δεκνζίσλ εζφδσλ, ζπρλά δίλεη ην 
άιινζη θαη ηε δηθαηνινγία γηα θνξνδηαθπγή. Πξάγκαηη, δηαθζνξά θαη θνξνδηαθπγή 
πνιχ ζπρλά, θάλνπλ ηαπηφρξνλα έληνλε ηελ παξνπζία ηνπο, θάηη πνπ φινη 
ζπκθσλνχλ φηη έπαημε ζεκαληηθφ ξφιν ζηελ πξφζθαηε Διιεληθή νηθνλνκηθή 
ηξαγσδία. 
Η δηαθζνξά θαη δηάβξσζε ηνπ πνιηηθνχ ζπζηήκαηνο, κέζσ κηαο ζεηξάο νηθνλνκηθψλ 
ζθαλδάισλ, ζε ζπλδπαζκφ κε κεγάιεο θιίκαθαο θνξνδηαθπγή θαη πνιχ ρακειήο 
πνηφηεηαο ππεξεζηψλ απφ πιεπξάο ηνπ θξάηνπο, ραξαθηεξίδνπλ ηε δεκφζηα δσή ηεο 
Διιάδαο γηα ηνπιάρηζηνλ ηηο ηξεηο ηειεπηαίεο δεθαεηίεο. Απηφ είρε ζαλ απνηέιεζκα ηε 
δξακαηηθή κείσζε ησλ δεκνζίσλ εζφδσλ, ηελ ακνηβαία θαρππνςία κεηαμχ ησλ 
πνιηηψλ θαη ηεο θεληξηθήο δηνίθεζεο θαη ηελ λνκηκνπνίεζε ηεο θνξνδηαθπγήο θαη ηεο 
δσξνδνθίαο. Η παξαβαηηθή ζπκπεξηθνξά ηνπ ελφο κέξνπο, αληαλαθιά άκεζα θαη 
γίλεηαη ζπκπιήξσκα ηεο παξαβαηηθφηεηαο ηνπ άιινπ. Όηαλ ην έλα κέξνο αλακέλεη ή 
πηζηεχεη φηη ην άιιν κέξνο ζα «θιέςεη» ηφηε ην ζεσξεί σθέιηκν (πνιιέο θνξέο θαη 
επηβεβιεκέλν) λα θιέςεη θη απηφ. 
Γεκηνπξγείηαη θαη΄ απηφλ ηνλ ηξφπν έλαο θαχινο θχθινο: Οη πνιίηεο απνθαζίδνπλ 
γηα ην χςνο ησλ εηζνδεκάησλ πνπ ζα δειψζνπλ ζηηο θνξνινγηθέο αξρέο, αλαιφγσο 
ηεο πηζαλφηεηαο λα ειεγρζνχλ θνξνινγηθά θαη ηνπ χςνπο ηνπ πξνζηίκνπ πνπ ζα 
θιεζνχλ λα πιεξψζνπλ ζε πεξίπησζε πνπ θαηαδηθαζηνχλ. Απφ ηελ άιιε νη 
πνιηηηθνί, έρνπλ ζπρλά ηε δπλαηφηεηα λα θαηαρξψληαη ζεκαληηθφ κέξνο ηνπ 
δεκνζίνπ ρξήκαηνο, πνπ πξννξίδεηαη γηα ην δεκφζην ζπκθέξνλ. 
΢ε απηφ ην πεξηβάιινλ δεκηνπξγνχληαη πνιιαπιέο, απηνεθπιεξνχκελεο ηζνξξνπίεο: 
κηα ζεηηθή (αξλεηηθή) ηζνξξνπία κε ρακειή (πςειή) δηαθζνξά, κε ρακειφ (πςειφ) 
πνζνζηφ θνξνδηαθπγήο θαη πςειφ (ρακειφ) πνζνζηφ ηεο δεκφζηαο δαπάλεο λα 
δηαηείζεηαη πξνο ην θνηλφ φθεινο. Η χπαξμε δηαθνξεηηθψλ ηζνξξνπηψλ καο βνεζά λα 
θαηαιάβνπκε πψο θξάηε κε θνηλή αθεηεξία, εκθαλίδνπλ δηαθνξεηηθά επίπεδα 
δηαθζνξάο θαη θνξνδηαθπγήο, θαζψο επίζεο πψο ηα θαηλφκελα απηά είλαη ηφζν 
δχζθνιν λα εμαιεηθζνχλ. 
΢ηε ζπλέρεηα εμεηάδνπκε ηηο ζπλήζεηο πεξηνξηζηηθέο πνιηηηθέο, φρη κφλν ζαλ έλα κέζν 
θαηαπνιέκεζεο ηεο δηαθζνξάο θαη ηεο θνξνδηαθπγήο, αιιά γεληθφηεξα ζαλ έλα 
ηξφπν επηινγήο ηεο βέιηηζηεο ηζνξξνπίαο. Παξνπζία πνιιαπιψλ ηζνξξνπηψλ, πνπ 
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είλαη απνηέιεζκα απφ ζηξαηεγηθέο ζπκπιεξσκαηηθφηεηαο ζηελ παξαβαηηθφηεηα ησλ 
δχν νκάδσλ, ησλ πνιηηψλ θαη ησλ πνιηηηθψλ, ηα ζπλήζε κέηξα, φπσο ηα πξφζηηκα 
γηα θνξνινγηθέο παξαβάζεηο, δελ είλαη πάληα απνηειεζκαηηθά. Μπνξεί λα απμάλνπλ 
ην θφζηνο επθαηξίαο ηεο θνξνδηαθπγήο θαη ηεο δηαθζνξάο, απνηπγράλνπλ φκσο λα 
εμαθαλίζνπλ ηηο ζηξαηεγηθέο ζπκπιεξσκαηηθφηεηαο κεηαμχ ησλ αληηπάισλ νκάδσλ. 
΢ηε ζπλέρεηα εμεηάδνπκε ηε ζπκβνιή ελαιιαθηηθψλ κέηξσλ ζπκκφξθσζεο. 
΢πγθεθξηκέλα εμεηάδνπκε ην θφζηνο πνπ πξνθχπηεη απφ ηνλ θνηλσληθφ ζηηγκαηηζκφ 
θάπνηνπ πνπ παξαλνκεί. Αλ ην θνηλσληθφ απηφ θφζηνο είλαη αξθεηά πςειφ, ηφηε 
εμαθαλίδεηαη ε πνιιαπιή ηζνξξνπία θαη ε νηθνλνκία ζπγθιίλεη πξνο κηα κνλαδηθή 
ηζνξξνπία. Η επηηπρία ηνπ ζπγθεθξηκέλνπ κέηξνπ έγθεηηαη ζην γεγνλφο φηη ζηνρεχεη 
θαη επζείαλ ζηνλ παξάγνληα πνπ δεκηνπξγεί ηελ πνιιαπιή ηζνξξνπία, δειαδή ηε 
ζπκπιεξσκαηηθφηεηα κεηαμχ ησλ αληηζέησλ νκάδσλ. 
Η ζρεηηθή βηβιηνγξαθία αλαθέξεη φηη θξάηε κε πεξεκθεξή δεκνζηνλνκηθά ζπζηήκαηα 
θαη πεξηνξηζηηθέο πνιηηηθέο, ζπρλά εκθαλίδνπλ δηαθνξεηηθά επίπεδα ζπκκφξθσζεο. 
Γηα λα εμεγήζνπλ ηηο δηαθνξέο απηέο νη εξεπλεηέο εηζάγνπλ ηελ έλλνηα ηνπ εζηθνχ 
θφζηνπο πνπ ζρεηίδεηαη κε ηε θνξνδηαθπγή. Άηνκα πνπ δελ είλαη παξαβαηηθά γεληθά, 
ζεσξνχλ ηε θνξνδηαθπγή κε εζηθά απνδεθηή. Απφ ηελ άιιε άηνκα πνπ δνπλ θαη 
θηλνχληαη ζε έλα πεξηβάιινλ παξαβαηηθφηεηαο απφ θίινπο θαη γλσζηνχο, ηείλνπλ θαη 
νη ίδηνη λα παξαβαηνχλ.  
Η απνηειεζκαηηθφηεηα ή νρη κηαο πνιηηηθήο γηα ηελ θαηαπνιέκεζε ηεο θνξνδηαθπγήο 
εμαξηάηαη απφ παξάγνληεο πνπ δελ κπνξνχλ εχθνια λα αληρλεπζνχλ θαη λα 
κεηξεζνχλ, αθφκε θη αλ πξφθεηηαη γηα κέηξα φπσο θνξνινγηθά πξφζηηκα θαη 
ειέγρνπο.  
Πνηεο πνιηηθέο κπνξεί λα πηνζεηήζεη κηα θπβέξλεζε, πξνθεηκέλνπ λα κεγηζηνπνηήζεη 
ην εζηθφ θφζηνο γηα θάπνηνλ πνπ θιέβεη ην θξάηνο; Τπάξρεη κεγάιε γθάκα 
θπβεξλεηηθψλ παξεκβάζεσλ πνπ κπνξνχλ λα αιιάμνπλ ηνλ ηξφπν πνπ 
αληηκεησπίδνπκε ηελ πιεξσκή ησλ θφξσλ. Μία απ΄ απηέο είλαη ε ζπζηεκαηηθή ρξήζε 
ησλ κέζσλ καδηθήο ελεκέξσζεο, γηα λα ηνληζηεί ην εζηθφ φθεινο απφ ηελ 
θνξνινγηθή ζπκκφξθσζε αθελφο θαη ε άζθεζε πίεζεο αθεηέξνπ ζηνπο 
παξαλνκνχληεο. (π.ρ. δεκνζηεχνληαο ηα αηνκηθά θνξνινγηθά έζνδα ή ηειεζίδηθεο 
πεξηπηψζεηο θνξνδηαθπγήο). Δπίζεο ε απνθπγή πνιηηηθψλ πνπ ππνλννχλ φηη ε 
θνξνδηαθπγή είλαη θνηλσληθά απνδεθηή, φπσο ε θνξνακλήζηεπζε. Καη ηέινο ε 
ππεξηφληζε ηεο άκεζεο ζρέζεο κεηαμχ ηεο θνξνινγηθήο ζπκκφξθσζεο, ησλ 
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θνξνινγηθψλ εζφδσλ θαη ηνπ επηπέδνπ ησλ ππεξεζηψλ πνπ απνιακβάλεη ν πνιίηεο 
απφ ην θξάηνο. 
΢πκπεξαζκαηηθά ζα ιέγακε φηη νη πνιίηεο είλαη πην πξφζπκνη λα ζπκκνξθσζνχλ 
θνξνινγηθά θαη λα απνδίδνπλ ηνπο θφξνπο πνπ ηνπο αλαινγνχλ ζην θξάηνο, φζν 
πηζηεχνπλ φηη ε θνξνινγηθή δηνίθεζε είλαη δίθαηε θαη απνηειεζκαηηθή. ΢ηελ πξάμε ε 
νηθνδφκεζε θιίκαηνο ακνηβαίαο εκπηζηζχλεο ζε θνηλσλίεο κε πςειφ δείθηε 
δηαθζνξάο είλαη εμαηξεηηθά δχζθνιε. Έηζη εμεγείηαη ε ηδηαίηεξα έληνλε επηκνλή ησλ 
θαηλνκέλσλ δηαθζνξάο θαη θνξνδηαθπγήο θαη ε δπζθνιία πνπ αληηκεησπίδνπλ ζπρλά 
νη θπβεξλψληεο νη νπνίνη ηίκηα θαη εηιηθξηλά πξνζπαζνχλ λα ηα θαηαπνιεκήζνπλ. 
Εςπωπαϊκή Νομιζμαηική Ένωζη (EMU 2.0) ΢ςμπεπάζμαηα από ηην κπίζη – 
νέο πλαίζιο ζηαθεπόηηηαρ και ανάπηςξηρ. 
Σα εξσηήκαηα πνπ εγείξνληαη απφ ηελ ηειεπηαία παγθφζκηα νηθνλνκηθή θξίζε, ε 
νπνία είρε άκεζε θαη νμεία επίδξαζε ζηα θξάηε κέιε πνπ απαξηίδνπλ ηελ 
Δπξσπατθή Ννκηζκαηηθή Έλσζε (EMU 2.0), ηε γλσζηή θαη σο Δπξσδψλε, 
απεηιψληαο άκεζα ηε ζπλνρή θαη ηελ αθεξαηφηεηά ηεο είλαη πνιιά. Ήηαλ ε 
ζηξαηεγηθή πνπ πηνζεηήζεθε θαη ηα ζπγθεθξηκέλα κέηξα γηα ηελ αληηκεηψπηζε ηεο 
θξίζεο ηα θαηάιιεια; ήηαλ ε πξνηεξαηφηεηα πνπ δφζεθε ζηε δεκνζηνλνκηθή 
ζηαζεξφηεηα δηθαηνινγεκέλε; είλαη ε ζηαζεξφηεηα θαη ε αλάπηπμε ηαπηφρξνλα 
εθηθηέο ζηελ επξσδψλε; πνην είλαη ην πεξηζψξην άζθεζεο εζληθήο νηθνλνκηθήο 
πνιηηηθήο ζην αζθπθηηθφ πιαίζην ηεο Δπξσπαηθήο πνιηηηθήο. 
Αηέιεηεο θαη παξαιείςεηο ζηελ νηθνδφκεζε ηεο επξσδψλεο δελ επέηξεςαλ ηελ 
έγθαηξε απνηξνπή ηεο θξίζεο, αιιά θαη ηελ ιήςε φισλ ησλ απαξαίηεησλ κέηξσλ γηα 
ηελ αληηκεηψπηζή ηεο, φηαλ απηή πξνέθπςε. 
Η παγθφζκηα ρξεκαηννηθνλνκηθή θξίζε ηνπ 2008-2009 κεηεμειίρζεθε ην 2010 ζε 
θξίζε εζληθνχ ρξένπο ζηελ δψλε ηνπ επξψ, πιήηησληαο ρψξεο κε ππεξβνιηθά 
ειιείκαηα θαη δνκηθέο αδπλακίεο. Η Διιάδα ήηαλ ε πξψηε ρψξα ηνπ επξψ πνπ 
ρηππήζεθε απφ ηελ θξίζε ζηηο αξρέο ηνπ 2010, αθνινπζνχκελε απφ κηα ζεηξά άιισλ 
θξαηψλ κειψλ φπσο ε Ιξιαλδία θαη ε Πνξηνγαιία ζηα ηέιε ηνπ 2010 θαη ηα κέζα ηνπ 
2011 αληίζηνηρα, ε Ιζπαλία ην 2012 θαη ε Κχπξνο ην 2013. Οη παξαπάλσ ρψξεο 
αληηκεηψπηζαλ ζεκαληηθέο αδπλακίεο, δηαθνξεηηθέο ζε θάζε πεξίπησζε, αιιά κε 
θνηλφ παξαλνκαζηή ηηο δπζθνιίεο εμαζθάιηζεο δηεζλψλ θεθαιαίσλ ππφ θαλνληθέο 
ζπλζήθεο. Οη παξαπάλσ νηθνλνκίεο, ήδε εμαζζελεκέλεο απφ ηελ παγθφζκηα θξίζε, 
δελ δηέζεηαλ ηελ αληνρή θαη ηελ επειημία λα αληαπεμέιζνπλ ηελ εζληθή θξίζε ρξένπο ε 
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θάζε κία κε ηα δηθά ηεο κέζα. Παξάιιεια παγηδεπκέλεο ζην ζπηξάι ηεο θξίζεο θαη 
ηεο χθεζεο, δελ κπφξεζαλ λα επσθειεζνχλ απφ ηελ βειηίσζε ηεο παγθφζκηαο 
νηθνλνκίαο θαη εκπνξίνπ ην 2010. 
Οη αδπλακίεο θαη νη αηέιεηεο ζην νηθνδφκεκα ηεο λνκηζκαηηθήο έλσζεο δελ εκπφδηζαλ 
ηελ εκθάληζε ζνβαξψλ αληζνηήησλ κεηαμχ ησλ θξαηψλ κειψλ θαη έθαλαλ 
δπζρεξέζηεξε ηε ιήςε κέηξσλ γηα ηελ αληηκεηψπηζε ηεο θξίζεο, φηαλ απηή 
πξνέθπςε. Δπηπιένλ δχν ιφγνη θαίλεηαη φηη έπαημαλ αξλεηηθφ ξφιν: 
Πξψηνλ ε επξσδψλε είρε ήδε πέζεη ζχκα ηεο ίδηαο ηεο επηηπρίαο ζηε δεκηνπξγία 
αλάπηπμεο θαη απαζρφιεζεο θαηά ηελ πξψηε δεθαεηία, θη έηζη δελ ήηαλ επηηαθηηθή ε 
αλάγθε γηα δηφξζσζε θαη ελαξκφληζε πνιηηηθήο, φηαλ έλα θξάηνο κέινο παξέθιηλε. 
Γεχηεξνλ θαη ζε άκεζε ζρέζε κε ην πξψην, ε άξλεζε θάπνησλ κεγάισλ θξαηψλ 
κειψλ λα ζεβαζζνχλ θαη λα εθαξκφζνπλ ηνπο θνηλά απνδεθηνχο δεκνζηνλνκηθνχο 
θαλφλεο. Υαξαθηεξηζηηθφ παξάδεηγκα απνηειεί ε πξνζπάζεηα Γεξκαλίαο θαη Γαιιίαο 
ην 2003 λα ζπκκνξθσζνχλ κε ηνπο δεκνζηνλνκηθνχο θαλφλεο ζρεηηθά κε ηε κείσζε 
ησλ εζληθψλ ειιεηκάησλ 
Η Διιεληθή θξίζε εζληθνχ ρξένπο θαη ε δηαρείξηζή ηνπ, είλαη θξίζηκα γηα λα 
αληηιεθζνχκε ηε δπλακηθή ηεο θξίζεο ζηελ επξσδψλε, θαζψο ε Διιάδα ήηαλ ην 
πξψην κέινο ην νπνίν ρηχπεζε ε θξίζε. Μεραληζκφο ζηήξημεο απφ ηελ Δπξσπαηθή 
Έλσζε δελ ππήξρε θαη έπξεπε λα δεκηνπξγεζεί έλαο απφ ηελ αξρή, ελψ ε 
αβεβαηφηεηα κεγάισλε, απεηιψληαο ηε ζηαζεξφηεηα θαη ηελ αθεξαηφηεηα ηεο 
επξσδψλεο. Τπήξρε κεγάιε αιιειεπίδξαζε κεηαμχ ηεο Διιεληθήο θξίζεο ρξένπο θαη 
ηεο ρξεκαηννηθνλνκηθήο θξίζεο ζηελ επξσδψλε, ε νπνία κε γνξγνχο ξπζκνχο 
απνθηνχζε ζπζηεκηθά ραξαθηεξηζηηθά. 
Μηα ζεκαληηθή θακπή ζηελ ηζηνξία ηεο θξίζεο εζληθνχ ρξένπο ηεο επξσδψλεο ήηαλ 
ην 2012, φηαλ έγηλε θνηλή πεπνίζεζε φηη εθηφο απφ ηε δεκηνπξγία κεραληζκψλ 
ζηήξημεο θαη ηελ ελίζρπζε ησλ δεκνζηνλνκηθψλ θαη καθξννηθνλνκηθψλ θαλφλσλ, 
ήηαλ αλάγθε λα εμαιεηθζεί ην ξίζθν ηεο απνζχλζεζεο ηεο επξσδψλεο, ην ζπάζηκν 
ηνπ θαχινπ θχθινπ κεηαμχ ησλ ηξαπεδψλ θαη ησλ εζληθψλ θπβεξλήζεσλ θαη ε 
κεηάβαζε πξνο κηα ηξαπεδηθή έλσζε. Γηα ην ιφγν απηφ ε δέζκεπζε ηνπ πξνέδξνπ 
ηεο Κεληξηθήο Δπξσπαηθήο Σξάπεδαο (ECB) ηνλ Ινχιην ηνπ 2012 Mario Draghi φηη: «η 
Ευρωπαική Κεντρική Τράπεζα είναι έτοιμη να κάνει ότι χρειαστεί για να προστατέψει 
το ευρώ», ήηαλ απνθαζηζηηθήο ζεκαζίαο. 
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Πνιηηηθέο πνπ πξνσζνχλ ηαπηφρξνλα ζηαζεξφηεηα θαη αλάπηπμε είλαη εθηθηέο ζην 
πιαίζην ηεο λνκηζκαηηθήο έλσζεο θαη ήδε νη πεξηζζφηεξεο εθαξκφδνληαη, ελψ 
πνιιέο είλαη ζην ζηάδην ηεο κειέηεο θαη πινπνίεζεο. Μεξηθέο απ΄απηέο ηηο πνιηηηθέο 
είλαη ε πηνζέηεζε ηζνζθειηζκέλσλ πξνππνινγηζκψλ ησλ θξαηψλ κειψλ, ε νπνία 
επηβάιιεηαη απφ ηελ Δπξσπαηθή Έλσζε θαη αλακέλεηαη λα έρεη πνιχ κεγαιχηεξα 
νθέιε απ΄ φηη πνιινί ζεσξνχλ, ε ηξαπεδηθή έλσζε, έλαο ηδηαίηεξα ζεκαληηθφο 
παξάγνληαο νηθνλνκηθήο ζηαζεξφηεηαο θαη αλάπηπμεο, θαζψο θαη νη λέεο πνιηηηθέο 
ελδπλάκσζεο θαη αλάπηπμεο ηεο Δζσηεξηθήο Δπξσπαηθήο Αγνξάο, κε έκθαζε ζηελ 
νηθνλνκηθή αλάθακςε θαη ηηο πξννπηηθέο ηεο Δπξσπαηθήο νηθνλνκίαο. 
΢ηα παξαπάλσ ζα πξέπεη λα πξνζηεζνχλ νη πνιηηηθέο πνπ ζηνρεχνπλ θαηεπζείαλ 
ζηελ νηθνλνκηθή αλάπηπμε. Σέηνηεο πνιηηηθέο είλαη νη ηδησηηθέο θαη δεκφζηεο 
επελδχζεηο, θαζψο θαη αλαπηπμηαθέο πνιηηηθέο ηφζν ζε εζληθφ, φζν θαη ζε θεληξηθφ 
επίπεδν, πνπ επηθεληξψλνληαη ζε δνκηθέο κεηαξξπζκίζεηο ζηελ εξγαζία θαη ηηο 
αγνξέο πξνηφλησλ θαη ππεξεζηψλ θαη ηέινο βειηίσζε ηνπ επηρεηξεκαηηθνχ 
πεξηβάιινληνο. 
΢πκπεξαζκαηηθά ζα ιέγακε φηη αδπλακίεο  θαη παξαιείςεηο ζηε δνκή ηεο 
λνκηζκαηηθήο έλσζεο ζηε δψλε ηνπ επξψ (Euro Monetary Union EMU), δελ 
επέηξεςαλ ηελ έγθαηξε απνθπγή ηεο κεηάδνζεο ηεο νηθνλνκηθήο θξίζεο αλάκεζα ζηα 
θξάηε κέιε ηεο έλσζεο θαη ηδηαίηεξα απφ ηελ πεξηθέξεηα πξνο ην θέληξν ηεο δψλεο, 
φπσο επίζεο θαη δπζθφιεςαλ ηηο φπνηεο πνιηηηθέο αληηκεηψπηζήο ηεο φηαλ απηή 
μέζπαζε.  
Μηα ζεκαληηθή θακπή ζηελ πξνζπάζεηα λα μεπεξαζηεί ε θξίζε δεκνζίνπ ρξένπο 
έιαβε ρψξα ην 2012, φηαλ νη αμησκαηνχρνη ηεο ΔΚΣ, κε ηε βνήζεηα κηαο ζεηξάο 
ζεζκηθψλ θαη νηθνλνκηθψλ κεηαξξπζκίζεσλ, θαηάθεξαλ λα ειέγμνπλ θαη λα 
απνηξέςνπλ ην ξίζθν ηεο δηάιπζεο ηεο επξσδψλεο. Παξάιιεια ε ηξαπεδηθή έλσζε 
ζρεδηάζηεθε ψζηε λα εληζρχζεη ηελ νηθνλνκηθή ζηαζεξφηεηα, ηελ επέθηαζε ησλ 
αγνξψλ θαη ηελ Δπξσπαηθή εζσηεξηθή αγνξά. 
Δίλαη θαζνιηθψο απνδεθηφ, φηη ε ζηξαηεγηθή ησλ Δπξσπαίσλ αμησκαηνχρσλ λα 
ξίμνπλ φιν ην βάξνο ζηελ νηθνλνκηθή ζηαζεξφηεηα ήηαλ πιήξσο δηθαηνινγεκέλε, 
εηδηθά ηα δχν πξψηα ρξφληα ηεο Δπξσπαηθήο θξίζεο, φηαλ ε αβεβαηφηεηα ζρεηηθά κε 
ηελ νηθνλνκηθή ζηαζεξφηεηα αθχξσλε θάζε πξνζπάζεηα αλάθακςεο ηεο νηθνλνκίαο. 
Πάλησο είλαη μεθάζαξν φηη ε βηψζηκε αλάπηπμε είλαη δσηηθήο ζεκαζίαο γηα ηελ 
νηθνλνκηθή ζηαζεξφηεηα θαη ηε γεληθή επεκεξία. Γηα ην ιφγν απηφ ε δεκηνπξγία ησλ 
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ζπλζεθψλ εθείλσλ ηφζν γηα ηελ νηθνλνκηθή αλάθακςε, φζν θαη γηα ηελ ηζρπξή 
αλάπηπμε, πξέπεη λα είλαη ζηαζεξέο ζηξαηεγηθέο ηφζν ζε επίπεδν Δπξσπαηθήο 
Έλσζεο φζν θαη ζε εζληθφ επίπεδν. 
΢ην ζεκείν απηφ ηίζεηαη ην εξψηεκα πνην είλαη ην πεξηζψξην άζθεζεο εζληθψλ 
πνιηηηθψλ ζην λέν πιαίζην νηθνλνκηθήο επνπηείαο. Η απάληεζε δελ είλαη εχθνιε, 
θαζψο βξηζθφκαζηε ζε αραξηνγξάθεηα χδαηα. Η θξίζε δελ έρεη εληειψο παξέιζεη 
θαη κέξνο ησλ κεηαξξπζκίζεσλ δελ έρνπλ αθφκε εθαξκνζηεί. Τπάξρεη άπιεηνο 
ρψξνο γηα ηελ εθαξκνγή εζληθψλ πνιηηηθψλ, αξθεί απηέο λα είλαη πξνζερηηθά 
ζρεδηαζκέλεο θαη λα ζηνρεχνπλ ζηελ νηθνλνκηθή πξννπηηθή ησλ θξαηψλ κειψλ. Σν 
λέν πνιηηηθφ πεξηβάιινλ είλαη αζθαιέζηεξν, θαζψο νη αδπλακίεο ζηε δνκή ηεο 
επξσδψλεο έρνπλ ζε κεγάιν βαζκφ δηνξζσζεί, αιιά θαη ζέηεη λέεο πξνθιήζεηο: 
Γειψζεηο πνπ έγηλαλ κε θάζε θαιή ζέιεζε αιιά ζε κεγάιν βαζκφ 
απξαγκαηνπνίεηεο, φπσο ε αλάγθε γηα «αλαπηπμηαθέο δνκηθέο κεηαξξπζκίζεηο» ή 
«αλαπηπμηαθέο δεκνζηνλνκηθέο πξνζαξκνγέο» πξέπεη λα απνθηήζνπλ λέν λφεκα θαη 
πεξηερφκελν, θηλεηνπνηψληαο φινπο ηνπο δηαζέζηκνπο πφξνπο θαη εκπεηξία. 
΢ρεηηθά κε ηηο επηθπιάμεηο πνπ ζπρλά δηαηππψλνληαη αλαθνξηθά κε ηελ πξννπηηθή 
ηεο επξσδψλεο ε απάληεζε είλαη απιή: Η εληζρπκέλε ρξεκαηννηθνλνκηθή επνπηεία, 
ζηα κέιε ηεο επξσδψλεο, ηα ζίγνπξα καθξννηθνλνκηθά ζηνηρεία, ε έληνλε θαη 
βηψζηκε εμσζηξέθεηα θαη ε πξννπηηθή ηεο Δζσηεξηθήο Δπξσπαηθήο Αγνξάο καο 
δίλνπλ θάζε ιφγν λα αηζηνδνμνχκε γηα ηηο πξννπηηθέο ηεο επξσδψλεο. Ωζηφζν είλαη 
άθξσο απαξαίηεηα θάπνηα επηπιένλ ζηνηρεία φπσο ε πεξαηηέξσ νηθνλνκηθή 
επνπηεία, ε πξνζήισζε ζε πγηή ζεκειηψδε ραξαθηεξηζηηθά, λνκηζκαηηθέο θαη 
νηθνλνκηθέο πνιηηηθέο, επέλδπζε ζε θπζηθφ θαη αλζξψπηλν θεθάιαην αιιά πάλσ απ΄ 
φια θαηλνηνκία, εμσζηξέθεηα, ηδέεο θαη πξνηάζεηο απέλαληη ζηνλ θνηλφ ζηφρν. 
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1. Definition of the contagion during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007 – 
2009  
During the last two decades the problem with crisis spillovers turns to be a major 
research topic for numerous scientists working in the field of economics and finance. 
The word “contagion” appears for the first time in the empirical finance vocabulary 
with the outbreak of the “Asian flu” and the “Russian virus” to name the occurrence of 
severe and unexpected crisis spillover effects. Up to date a huge body of literature is 
engaged with the study of this phenomenon, nevertheless, the necessity to further 
develop and deepen this research strand is evidenced by the dense intensity of 
financial bubble bursts observed during the last years. Yet, there is no doubt that the 
2008 financial crisis is the most recent one commensurate in its severity with that of 
the Great Depression. It did spread extremely rapidly all over the globe, hitting 
financial markets and economic sectors worldwide, which has urged the search for 
profound understanding of the spillover processes that took place. Even though a 
considerable amount of literature is already available, still some aspects of the crisis 
are barely studied. In particular, most of the papers are focused on the spillover 
processes that took place, but little attention has been paid to the recovery phase of 
the crisis even though this issue is of growing importance not only for investors but 
also for policy-makers. 
Apart from identification of the channels through which contagion propagate, the 
development of adequate counter-cyclical policies requires awareness on the speed 
by which markets synchronize with the crisis epicenter as well as understanding of 
the factors that might slow or even hamper recovery. It is very important to examine 
these issues for a number of European stock markets as they seem to be important 
cornerstones for the subsequent recession observed in Europe. There is a distinction 
between expected and unexpected spillover effects, as the former are subject to 
modeling, while the latter are unpredictable. The speed of synchronization between a 
sample of European and the US stock markets must be estimated so as to build up 
expectations on the rate of recovery. 
The importance of such a distinction comes from the fact that the unexpected 
spillover effects are unpredictable therefore the task to design and implement proper 
anti-crisis policies aggravates significantly. At the same time when the spillover 
drivers are confined mainly to existing (fundamental) market dependencies, it might 
be expected that the recovery in the epicenter market would foster the recovery in 
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the other markets. It should be noted that the available literature suggests that the 
2008 crisis‟ spillover is due to both high level of financial integration and contagion. 
On one hand, some recent studies provide strong evidence of contagion and reveal 
its major channels, while other studies argue that the violent spread across countries 
and economic sectors comes as a consequence of high financial integration.  
A major finding is that the emerging economies recovered more strongly than 
advanced ones, still heterogeneity is present with the emerging economies from 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia performing worst. However, the question on the 
differences across EU member states is still unexplored and its answer seems to be 
of amplifying importance in light of the still on-going Eurozone crisis. While the 
existing literature puts emphasis solely on the influence of negative shocks, it is very 
important to investigate the propagation of both negative and positive shocks.  
The economic intuition suggests that when two economies are well integrated 
through trade, investment and financial relationships, a crisis occurrence in one of 
them is likely to spread rapidly to the other. An exposure to financial globalization 
may carry increased vulnerability to a financial crisis. Several recent papers are 
supportive to this hypothesis, however, it is econometrically difficult to separate 
contagion from globalization. This poses the question what is the difference between 
globalization (integration) and contagion, and why it is important to distinguish 
between them. 
The most popular and widely applied definition of contagion is introduced by Forbes 
and Rigobon (2002) 
Def. 1. : A significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock to one country 
(or a group of countries). The paper points out that if two stock markets exhibit high 
level of co-movement during calm periods, than the continued high correlation after a 
shock to one of the markets suggests interdependence, while contagion is present 
only in the case of a significant co-movement increase.  
Def. 2. : The co-movement in excess of that implied by the factor model. It should be 
noted that both of the definitions make use of the notion of co-movement. However, 
the co-movement is not directly observable, it is rather an issue of measurement, 
with the correlation coefficient being the most common and widely enhanced 
measure. According to the first definition, the observed correlation increase indicates 
presence of contagious effects, though, the drivers behind them are not clear. The 
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causes might be sought in the existing trade and financial relationships. Alternatively, 
there might be a presence of pure contagion, such as herd behavior, i.e. the case 
when all traders choose the same action irrespective of the available information or a 
“wake-up call” describing the state of investors reassessing the risk of countries other 
than those where the crisis was originally restricted to. 
Def. 2 allows to distinguish between two main drivers of a crisis spillover – these are 
market fundamentals and pure contagion. While the effects due to existing 
fundamentals are subject to modeling, the pure contagion is hard or even impossible 
to predict. 
Def. 3. Expected spillover effect: The increase in co-movement, which is predicted on 
the basis of modeled fundamental dependencies. 
Def. 3 implies that an unexpected spillover effect would be the increase in co-
movement, which could not be predicted on the basis of modeled fundamental 
dependencies. A detailed discussion on the policy implications is provided in the last 
subsection of the literature review. Here it suffice to note that any crisis might be 
viewed as a negative shock to the studied system. Yet, we believe that the 
propagation of both negative and positive shocks should be considered when 
planning monetary and fiscal policies. Particularly, what matters for policy markers is 
the rate of a shock absorption. 
Def. 4. Rate of a shock absorption: The speed by which a shock to one market (or a 
group of markets) propagates to another market. Similarly to the concept of co-
movement, the speed of propagation is not directly observable therefore we would 
study the speed of stock market synchronization instead. 
Contagion analysis has important implications for macroeconomic policy 
development. We can outline four major decision areas that can benefit from 
contagionand stock market integration studies: 
1. Improving monetary and fiscal policy decisions. Monetary and fiscal policy 
decisions are prone to become inefficient in case of problems in a large economy 
that are spilled over financial markets and/or international trade. Therefore, policy 
makers need to make sure contagion is accounted for not only when planning 
particular policies but also when setting up long term goals. For example, countries 
that are subject to quick absorption of problems and external shocks should aim for 
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more conservative policy rules and make sure that discretionary policies pay as 
much attention to foreign markets as to the development of domestic economy. 
2. Improving our understanding of processes going inside large politico-economic 
unions, like EU for example, which include member states suffering from different 
economic problems. Contagion analysis offers a new point of view that is capable to 
outline these differences and at the same time provide hints on policies and changes 
needed to close the gaps. For example member states that belong to different 
groups, would require different policies and eventually different rules regarding their 
budget deficits, inflation rates and reserves.  
3. Improving strategic trade decisions and analyzing long-term implications of 
choosing international trade partners. With regard to strategic trade decisions, 
spillover effects offer a different view on expected outcome of government 
interventions as well as on the acceptance of new trade rules. Considering that 
strategic trade theory itself is based on a foundation that assumes existence of 
market inefficiencies, the contagion analysis can help quantify and locate them. 
4. Improving our understanding of internationalization and regionalization in the 
global economy. This is important when analyzing economic policies that are 
implemented gradually and are expected to take time before actual results are seen. 
 
2. Transmission of sovereign risk in the Euro crisis 
In late 2009, with the global economy inching out of the Great Recession, the 
sovereign debt crisis hit Europe with a remarkable pace and vigor. Fears of 
sovereign insolvency initially developed in one peripheral country, Greece, but 
quickly spread to other European countries, prompting policymakers to take bold 
actions aimed at stopping contagion. 
Sovereign risk may propagate across borders through multiple channels. In the 
context of the Euro crisis, however, the public debate has repeatedly stressed the 
role of financial linkages across countries, and, in particular, of cross-border bank 
exposures as drivers of contagion. Following a common line of argument, a looming 
Greek sovereign default would transmit more heavily to the banking systems of other 
European countries, the more these latter are exposed to Greek sovereign debt. A 
troubled foreign banking system, in turn, constitutes a liability to its sovereign through 
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implicit guarantees and thus increases the respective sovereign risk. By similar 
mechanisms, cross-border interbank lending can matter: as the Greek banking 
system becomes stressed in a Greek sovereign debt crisis, foreign counterparties of 
Greek banks are adversely affected, which again strains the financial health of the 
respective foreign countries. While those and related channels have been frequently 
debated, the importance of cross-border financial linkages for the transmission of 
sovereign risk is contended and their exact role in the Euro crisis ultimately remains 
an empirical issue. 
There are indications that a 1% shock to Greek sovereign CDS premia is associated 
with a 0.275% increase in the CDS premia of the average European country, which 
suggests economically significant transmission rate. These spillover effects also 
appear to be long-lived, leading to persistent increases in CDS premia in all 
countries. 
There are different types of financial linkages, such as exposure to public debt and 
bank-to-bank lending. It is suggested that bilateral exposures to sovereign debt 
constitute economically and statistically significant transmission channels. 
Specifically, a reduction of sovereign debt exposures by one standard deviation is 
associated with a decline of the response to Greek shocks by roughly 0.12 – which is 
about 43% of the estimated rate of transmission. 
On the contrary, there is no robust support for transmission through bank-to-bank 
lending.  
A different strand of the literature has focused on market sentiments and coordination 
problems among investors to explain the onset of financial crises and their spreading. 
Empirically, the decomposition between fundamental and non-fundamental contagion 
poses some clear challenges, as the latter depends on factors that are not directly 
observable (e.g., market expectations).  
Finally, contagion may also occur if shocks in one country affect market expectations 
regarding the terms of international policy cooperation. Applying this logic to the Euro 
crisis, one could argue the news stemming from Greece informed investors about the 
EU commitment to guarantee the debt of other countries in distress, and thus 
contributed to propagate the crisis. 
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The use of financial news to identify country-specific shocks becomes popular in the 
recent literature and has in some cases been applied to the specific context of the 
Euro crisis. 
It is confirmed that shocks to sovereign solvency in one country should have the 
strongest spillover effects on those countries that are directly exposed to the 
country's government debt. The coefficient capturing the relation between trade 
linkages and transmission remains statistically insignificant when the transmission of 
sovereign risk across European countries is significantly related to the financial 
exposures to Greek debt, and to Greek Public Debt in particular. At the same time, 
however, a substantial amount of transmission or contagion remains unexplained, 
especially to the crisis countries Spain and Portugal, which indicates that alternative 
channels are at work at the same time. 
Of course, the general vulnerability of an economy may be a key factor for the rate of 
transmission of sovereign risk and, at the same time, influence the exposure to 
Greek debt. Specifically, banks in vulnerable countries may respond stronger to news 
shocks to Greece. If, at the same time, the banks in vulnerable crisis countries 
engage in gambling-for-resurrection investment strategies or if these banks are more 
reluctant to recognize losses on their Greek debt positions (and engage in creative 
accounting), the estimates, may suffer an upward bias. 
Some concerns may remain related to the possibility that the crisis countries are 
fundamentally different from others in both dimensions, the rate of transmission and 
the exposure to Greek debt.  
A different potential concern is related to the perception and the interpretation of 
Greek shocks in financialmarkets. In particular, if market participants perceive the 
Greek news as shocks to global financial stability (not captured by the exogenous 
variables), then a country's CDS response on the days of Greek events may depend 
on its total foreign exposure, instead of the exposure to Greece. In this case, the 
relation between risk transmission and financial exposure to Greece may be 
spuriously affected by changes in the external exposure or simply to portfolio size. 
There are also indirect financial linkages to Greece. In particular, if French banks are 
strongly exposed to Greek public debt but Spanish banks are not, the Spanish banks 
might nevertheless suffer from an increase in Greek sovereign risk due to indirect 
exposure through the French banking system. This suggests that accounting for the 
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entire network of cross-border financial linkages may be important to assess the role 
of bank-to-bank lending for the transmission of risk. Nevertheless, the results confirm 
that the transmission of Greek sovereign risk is affected by the exposure to Greek 
Public Debt. Overall, these results indicate that the link between financial exposure 
and risk spillovers is quite robust to different selections of Greek shocks. 
 
3. Global transmission channels for international bank lending 
The environment that characterizes a financial crisis is typically one of fear, turmoil, 
and despair. For an international bank, these sentiments are experienced as 
heightened uncertainty over the value of its asset holdings, fluctuations in access to 
funding from interbank liquidity markets, and changes in its solvency due to balance 
sheet considerations. These three channels - of uncertainty, liquidity, and solvency - 
in turn affect the flow of credit provided by banks over the course a crisis. It is crucial 
to illuminate the manner by which each of these channels, operating at the global 
level, affected cross-border lending by developed-country banks to developing 
countries during the run-up, onset, and immediate aftermath of the global financial 
crisis of 2007-09. 
Gaining a better understanding of how different bank credit channels function during 
a financial crisis is important, because the appropriate mitigation measures deployed 
by policymakers-whether before or after the fact-may differ according to the operative 
channel. For example, if liquidity access is the binding constraint, then the domestic 
central bank can relax its discount window, or engage in currency swap agreements 
with foreign central banks, in order to provide the necessary liquidity and alleviate the 
credit crunch. In contrast, if the problem is one of solvency, ex ante micro and macro-
prudential regulation may be more appropriate to limit the buildup of potentially 
nonperforming assets in the first place. Indeed, the issue of liquidity versus solvency 
is routinely discussed in the context of financial crisis management. 
While the specific conditions that govern the contraction of credit by banks are 
undoubtedly unique, understanding how these channels operate at the global level  is 
also important. A global liquidity shock can exert an independent and significant 
impact on bank funding and lending activities, over and above bank-specific liquidity 
contractions. Global perceptions regarding solvency also account for the bulk of 
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variations in credit spreads for sovereign borrowing. And uncertainty at the global 
level contributes as much as local sentiment to market returns. 
Many findings suggest that during the crisis, bank liquidity problems and uncertainty 
were the main channels by which the crisis affected cross-border lending from high 
income to developing countries, and that the solvency channel was relatively 
unimportant. Furthermore, the banks' sensitivity to these factors did not actually 
change during the crisis; that is, the effect of the crisis on lending was essentially a 
normal reaction to changes in interbank liquidity and economic uncertainty, and that 
the outsized impact on lending was due to abnormally large shocks to liquidity and 
uncertainty, rather than to any change in banks' sensitivity to funding availability or 
risk. However, disaggregating lending into that by EU banks and that by U.S. banks 
yields a more nuanced message, with European banks becoming increasingly 
sensitive to market conditions during the most acute phase of the crisis, but this 
effect being offset, at least in part, by behavior of U.S. banks. 
One important strand of literature is work related to the impact that foreign bank 
presence has on credit availability, especially in developing countries. Foreign bank 
presence has been found to affect both overall and small business, lending in Latin 
America and India. Across the developing world, the entry of foreign banks has had 
measurable influence on credit access by domestic firms, although the evidence 
favoring greater or lesser financing availability has been mixed. 
Many findings are also related to the studies concerned with the role that foreign 
banks play in domestic credit provision during times of financial stress. Foreign banks 
were more successful than domestics in sustaining credit in some crises, compared 
to others. Very often regarding on banks' internal financing markets, liquidity and 
solvency are treated as bank-specific controls, rather than as channels of credit 
contraction; they also entirely omit the uncertainty channel. 
A final group of papers is concerned with liquidity management by international 
banks, especially those based in the United States. One early study examined the 
determinants of the allocation of banking assets, and found that existing economic 
ties, level of development of the host economy, and domestic deposits were all 
correlated with greater asset holdings. However, asset holdings are not equivalent to 
liquidity exposures, and subsequent studies have attempted to make a more direct 
connection to credit provision. For example, bank lending to emerging markets is 
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found remarkably stable, and largely insulated from demand conditions in the host 
economies. 
Transmission channels in theory: 
In the presence of credit frictions, awedge arises between the cost of funds raised 
externally and the opportunity cost of internal funds; this is the so-called “external 
finance premium.” One way that the premium affects bank lending is that it can shift 
the available supply of banks' intermediated credit  increases in the premium during a 
financial crisis, for example, will reduce banks' ability to raise financing and hence 
lower their amount of lending. We term this the liquidity channel for financial shocks. 
There is evidence that the liquidity channel is an important conduit for monetary 
policy in general; it appears to have been relevant for the recent financial crisis as 
well. 
Another way that the external finance premium affects bank lending is by weakening 
balance sheets. In a crisis, credit rationing in the wholesale credit market leads to 
increases in the external finance premium. A higher premium erodes banks' net 
worth, and since international banks routinely operate in the global interbank market 
as demanders of capital, their weakened balance sheets hinder their access to 
wholesale funds, which in turn lead them to scale back on lending.We regard this 
balance sheet effect as the solvency channel for the effect of financial shocks. The 
importance of the solvency channel has been empirically verified for periods of tight 
money, as well as, more specifically, in the context of financial crises. 
Finally, with informational imperfections, interest rates on loans may no longer serve 
as an efficient mechanism for the allocation of credit. Financial crises reduce banks' 
expected profits from lending, since they capture a smaller fraction of total returns 
when uncertainty is high. The reduced profitability and returns in turn increase the 
reluctance of banks to lend. More generally, perceptions of the value of risky assets 
on bank balance sheets may be endogenous to market conditions, which can 
influence the supply of bank loans. This mechanism is defined as the uncertainty 
channel for financial shock transmission. Taken together, these three channels can 
impact a bank's credit provision when it is experiencing (or not) a financial crisis. 
Empirically, uncertainty shocks have been shown to be crucial for understanding 
bank lending it was also a factor conditioning contagion during financial crises. 
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These three channels all appear to have been important in the 2007-09 financial 
crisis. At the onset of the crisis, concerns about the ability of counterparties to make 
good on unsecured loans disrupted interbank credit markets, which resulted in a 
liquidity crunch, observed as sharp increases in the spread between the interbank 
lending rate and the overnight index swap. Liquidity became even more scarce in the 
aftermath of the Lehman collapse in September 2008, as banks faced widespread 
difficulties in obtaining even basic rollover credit. 
Concerns over bank solvency grew gradually as the crisis wore on. Spreads on credit 
default swaps (CDS) for bank bonds began to widen considerably, suggesting 
increasing concerns over (bank) credit impairment as a result of worsening balance 
sheets. Interestingly, the volatility of asset returns -while undoubtedly heightened 
during the initial crisis period- really only took off in the second phase of the crisis, 
with the implied volatility of the S&P 500 jumping sharply in September 2008. 
It is clear that controlling for the crisis period results in important differences. Funding 
liquidity problems tend to be negatively associated with cross-border lending, but the 
effect is partially offset during the crisis either by convexity in the negative 
relationship or by contravening effects of unobservables. 
The results from this specification also suggest that lending to developing countries is 
affected by financial shocks primarily through the liquidity and uncertainty channels: 
the coefficients for the liquidity and uncertainty channels are both negative and 
statistically significant at the conventional levels. The solvency channel, in contrast to 
these two, does not appear to be important. 
Although the estimated coefficients on these two variables are admittedly small the 
economic impact of these channels are actually nontrivial. In particular, since the 
crisis saw these variables increase by several hundred percent, changes of this 
magnitude were associated with economically significant reductions in cross-border 
lending. 
Credit contraction during a crisis may be due to changes in the volatility of banks' 
asset holdings, their access to liquidity, and their balance sheets, all of which lead 
them to withhold credit from borrowers. But the elasticity of credit provision to each of 
these considerations may also be different during a crisis. For example, a bank may 
be forced to limit its lending due to the greater difficulty that it faces in obtaining 
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liquidity in primary markets (a level effect), but also due to a heightened sensitivity to 
liquidity scarcity under crisis conditions (an elasticity effect). 
The impact of liquidity problems and uncertainty on bank lending during the crisis 
was due entirely to changes in these variables during the crisis, and not to changes 
in sensitivity to these variables. In the case of the uncertainty measure, this result 
sheds light on the question of whether risk aversion itself changed during the crisis, 
or whether market participants, facing a shock to uncertainty and risk, took actions to 
reduce their risk exposure; our results support the latter of these two competing 
views. 
Finally, the statistically-significant coefficients for the control variables are consistent 
with a priori theory. Bank lending to developing countries is greater for larger 
economies, and smaller for economies with higher inflation rates (perhaps due to 
greater ex ante uncertainty of real returns on loans, or because inflation proxies for a 
less favorable policy environment more broadly). There does not appear to be a 
significant association of lending with growth, nor of demand for dollar-denominated 
business loans in the United States. 
 
4. Mutual funds flows and the geography of contagion 
Over the last decade, a growing literature has documented the ability of financial 
intermediaries to propagate shocks across borders. Along with banks, the fund 
industry has attracted particular attention and is now recognized as an important 
vehicle of financial contagion. In particular, recent empirical contributions have found 
compelling evidence of “contagious” portfolio rebalancing at the fund level, with 
adverse consequences for countries in the same portfolio. 
Yet, little is known about the geography of contagion. Where does contagion actually 
spread? So far, the existing literature has had little to say about this issue. Although 
most studies present developing countries as the main victims of contagion through 
funds, it is unclear which country is subject to it. In addition, recent evidence has 
pointed to fire sales (or purchases) from funds propagating shocks across mature 
markets, suggesting that such phenomena are in fact not restricted to emerging 
markets. 
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As a result, some important questions remain to be explored: How do micro patterns, 
such as contagious portfolio rebalancing or fire sales/purchases at the fund level, 
translate at the macro level? If contagion does exist, who is affected? What are the 
countries that are most sensitive to contagion through funds? 
First, we find that only a handful of countries happen to receive/lose funding in 
isolation. Second, we find strong evidence of global contagion in both equity and 
bond flows. Periods of high (low) financial stress and poor (good) macroeconomic 
outlooks in advanced markets are being associated with equity and bond outflows 
(inflows) at the world level. Although these global waves originate in developed “
core” countries however, emerging markets’ funding is much more affected than 
mature markets’. Third, we find that the level of political risk, as well as the distance 
between the location of the fund and the recipient country, are the best predictors of 
contagion sensitivity. In other words, when facing a shock at home, investors tend to 
cut (or increase) their exposure to risky countries to a greater extent. Our findings 
suggest that distance and political risk act as the main risk criteria in the eyes of 
investors and managers, thereby exposing fragile emerging countries to sudden 
stops (or surges). 
Previous variance decompositions have clearly highlighted the extent of co-
movement in mutual fund flows. To what extent are these co-movements likened to 
contagion? and who is affected? On the one hand, the existence of an “emerging 
market” region in the bond model implies that all emerging markets tend to lose (or 
gain) funding at the same time, irrespective of their actual location or macroeconomic 
environment. Such an emerging market dynamic is in line with the emergence of 
emerging market bonds as an asset class per se, in which investors herd when in 
search for yield and retrench from when conditions deteriorate. In addition, this 
finding would rationalize the fact that spreads on emerging market bonds tend to 
move in tandem over time, although no clear (bilateral) trade or financial connection 
exists across these markets. 
Second, we find that many countries are in fact subject to the “global contagion” 
channel. Funding shocks at “home, i.e. where funds are domiciled, translate into fire 
sales (and purchases) in countries within the same portfolio, in particular emerging 
markets. As a result, shocks in core countries tend to be propagated to countries in 
the periphery, thereby generating surges (stops) in emerging markets when 
Athens MBA; “Contagion effects in the government bond 
markets. Evidence from the EMU 2.0 crisis” 
 
Ιωάννης Ξηνταρόπουλος                                     2016 Page 33 
 
conditions improve (deteriorate) at home. With the exception of a handful of 
developed markets, fund flows are driven by shocks originating in the domicile of 
funds, i.e. in advanced countries. Developing countries, in particular, are substantially 
affected by these “push” effects coming from developed markets. 
 Country characteristics and global contagion sensitivity 
Why are some countries more sensitive to global contagion than others? In other 
words, what makes investors eager to enter (leave) a country when conditions 
improve (deteriorate)? (i) Rule of law and investor protection; (ii) Political instability; 
(iii) Transparency, Governance and Accountability at the corporate level; (iv) Sound 
money; (v) Economic risk; (vi) Public Finance; and (vii) Distance. 
We find that three criteria – political risk, trade openness and distance – are robust in 
the equity specification, while only two – political risk and distance – are robust in the 
bond specification. This finding suggests that investors facing shocks at home tend to 
modify their exposure to a wide set of countries. However, they do all the more so in 
“risky” countries. Our results suggest that the level of political risk and the distance 
act as the main “risk criteria” in the eyes of fund managers. As a result, sudden 
surges/stops tend to strike fragile countries, i.e. emerging markets with unstable 
political systems and poor connection to the main financial centers. 
 Push vs pull factors in portfolio investments 
A major question running through the capital flow literature is whether the forces that 
drive capital flows are attributable to external “push” factors or to domestic “pull
”factors. Many findings clearly support the presence of strong push factors driving 
portfolio investments at the global level. In particular, financial stress, 
macroeconomic news and interest rates in advanced markets seem to be the main 
source of “push” factors, inducing international investors to increase (or reduce) 
exposure to foreign markets. However, we also find that structural “pull” factors 
(such as political stability and distance) determine the exact direction and magnitude 
of these waves of portfolio flows. 
Taken together, these findings are well connected to other empirical contributions 
that have emphasized the importance of mature market conditions – such as interest 
rates, liquidity, risk levels or weak economic performance – in generating capital 
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movements. On the other hand, they also seriously downplay the relevance of short-
term pull factors, such as purely domestic growth/productivity shocks, in driving 
flows. Most countries turn out to be dominated by external conditions and only a 
handful of countries economies – regional economic leaders or countries 
experiencing a crisis – seem to be driven by idiosyncratic dynamics. In fact, our 
findings appear more in line with the most recent case studies that find “little or no 
role for domestic macroeconomic conditions”. 
Given the importance of regional co-movement in capital flows, such a method tends 
to interpret as an idiosyncratic dynamic what is in fact the result of regional co-
movement. Although these regional dynamics might reflect truly regional “pull” 
factors (capturing strong regional macroeconomic dynamics, see for instance the 
case of Western Europe in the equity model), others may simply reflect contagion 
effects that do not reflect any commonality (e.g. emerging markets region in the bond 
model). Although discussing and estimating the potential bias in existing studies far 
beyond the scope of this paper, we stress that the omission of regional dynamics in 
previous push vs pull factor decompositions probably overestimated the actual 
impact of pull factors. 
In conclusion there is strong evidence of global contagion: when financial conditions 
in developed markets change, emerging markets’ funding is heavily affected. In 
general, the results suggest that push effects from advanced market investors affect 
massively developing countries and expose them to sudden stops and surges. The 
patterns of contagion seem to reflect, to a certain extent, the structure of the financial 
industry itself. For instance, the intensity of the global contagion might be a sign of 
the growing importance of so-called global funds who invest both in advanced 
economies and in emerging markets. In addition, the fact that regional dynamics fit 
geographical regions in the equity model might be the result of the dominance of 
regional funds in the equity market, whereas the dichotomy between advanced and 
emerging markets in the bond model might reflect the dominance of funds with a 
mandate to invest in either all emerging markets or all advanced economies (e.g. 
high-yield vs low-yield bond funds). This suggests, in turn, that management rules 
and portfolio restrictions probably shape the form of contagion. In that case, 
monitoring the portfolio of major investors could help in predicting the way contagion 
is likely to spread and designing appropriate policy responses.  
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Second, it seems that the rise of the asset management industry is coming at a price, 
including pro-cyclical lending, contagion and spillovers. Many findings support the 
view that asset managers or funds may not always act as “deep-pocket”investors 
at the global level. In particular mutual funds with a retail investor base do not seem 
seem to play a stabilizing role, in particular buying assets at low prices in crisis times. 
 
5. Global financial crisis and emerging stock market contagion 
The 2007–2009 global financial crisis was a chain reaction of credit risk inherent in 
engineered financial instruments, triggered by the liquidity shortfall in the United 
States banking system. It was the combination of three financial products, 
Residential Mortgage Backed Securities, Collateralized Debt Obligations, and Credit 
Default Swaps, in addition to some other major products, that caused the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis which later spread across global markets. Different from previous 
financial crises, such as the 1997–1998 Asian crisis, the 1998 Russian crisis, the 
1999 Brazilian crisis,the 2007–2009 global financial crisis originated from the largest 
and most influential economy, the U.S. market, and had a contagion effect on all 
economies around the world. It is well-documented that international stock markets 
react, in terms of returns and volatility, quickly and simultaneously to major financial 
crises. However, the timing and magnitude of changes in stock returns and volatility 
differ across markets around the world. Therefore, the 2007–2009 global financial 
crisis provide a unique opportunity for investigating the dynamic interrelationships 
among global stock markets. Studies of the transmission of volatility shocks from one 
market to another are essential in finance, as they have many implications for 
international asset pricing, assessing investment and leverage decisions, and 
portfolio allocation as well as policy makers to develop strategies to insulate 
economies.  
The general findings of these studies suggest that global stock markets‟ volatilities 
increase substantially during the crisis, which further implies that both stock markets‟ 
volatilities and correlations move together over time. However, they did not expose 
how and to what extent the 2007–2009 global financial crisis impacts the dynamic 
adjustment of volatility and the persistence of these transmission effects. That is to 
say, there are not confirmative findings about how a shock to one market influences 
the dynamic adjustment of volatility to another market and the persistence of these 
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transmission effects. In the meantime, one of the most important motivations for 
considering the BRICS is that they are considered the growth engine of the world 
economy and their stock market is a very promising area for regional and global 
portfolio diversification. The impacts of the 2007–2009 global financial crisis on 
conditional volatilities in the BRICSs‟ stock markets may have significant implications 
for domestic and international investors.  
The U.S. and BRICSs‟ stock markets are interrelated by their volatilities. These 
interdependencies indicate that in explaining the changes in volatility in the BRICSs‟ 
market, the part of the U.S. market cannot be ruled out a priori. Another 
consequence is that taking into account those transmissions should improve the 
accuracy of forecasts. Second, and with respect to the size and persistence of 
volatility transmission among the U.S. and BRICSs‟ stock markets, we find that one 
historical event, i.e. the 2007–2009 global financial crisis, has positive and large 
impacts on expected conditional variances, and only “large” shocks compared to the 
current level of volatility will result in an increase in expected conditional volatilities. 
Moreover, the size and the dynamics of the impact of shock are largely market 
specific, which has been illustrated by the fact that the BRICSs‟ stock markets with a 
higher degree of exposure to the U.S., e.g. Brazil, tend to be more heavily impacted 
by the 2007–2009 global financial crisis.  
Finally, there is strong evidence in favour of increased amplitude of shocks in 
recently years. This intensity of shocks mainly stems from the increased integration 
of the U.S. and BRICSs‟ stock markets documented in the recent era. Consequently, 
had a shock similar to the one of the 2008 financial crisis occurred in the more recent 
years, the impact of it on expected conditional variance would have been significantly 
higher nowadays compared to the initial dates when the financial crises occurred. 
Nevertheless, these findings suggest that international investors should be cautious 
about simultaneously investing in market that exhibit contagion, since the 
comovements of the U.S. and BRICSs‟ stock markets in some degree will disappear 
the portfolio benefits when are most wanted.  
However, the different response of the BRICSs‟ stock markets to the 2007–2009 
global financial crisis provides valuable opportunity for international investors to 
benefit most from portfolio diversification. Similarly, and as we have focused on 
financial crisis, new insights may be gained by investigating the impact of other types 
of shocks on expected conditional volatility in the future. The impulse response 
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analysis could also be applied to detect the impact of shocks on conditional 
covariances and then correlations, which is particularly alive in the financial literature 
and be of practical importance to financial practitioners in making optimal portfolio 
allocation decisions. 
 
6. An industry analysis of the European financial market dependence 
The recent sovereign debt crisis has renewed the interest in European integration 
and the Euro by policy makers, central bankers and researchers. Although concerns 
about the future of the common European currency never completely ceased, the 
crisis has caused an unprecedented challenge to the Euro and has called into 
question the homogeneity of European countries on which the success of the 
monetary union is built. Consequently, the crisis is not just a financial crisis but also a 
crisis of confidence in the strength of the monetary union. 
Previous studies that investigate European equity market dependence have focused 
on the country level. However, many researchers suggest that factors at the industry 
level are likely more important drivers of changes in equity market dependence, 
particularly after the launch of the Euro.  
Consequently, our empirical results for the impact of the introduction of the Euro 
show that many industries of countries with larger capitalization exhibit a dependence 
increase with their corresponding Euro-area markets. Specifically, most dependence 
dynamics of the industries in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain 
show a clear increase around the introduction of the Euro. Industries in Belgium and 
Finland have also become significantly more pan-Euro, despite the fact that these 
countries are relatively small. Furthermore, significant differences exist with regard to 
the impact of the Euro on industrial sectors. In particular, the Financials, Industrials, 
Consumer Goods, Utilities, Technology and Telecommunications industries show a 
significant increase in dependence in most countries. The effects are particularly 
strong statistically and economically for Financials, Utilities, Technology and 
Telecommunications, which show a remarkable dependence increase with their 
corresponding Euro-area indices in almost all countries. By contrast, there is no clear 
increase for most of the industries in countries outside the Euro area such as 
Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and the United Kingdom. 
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With regard to the more recent episode, we observe higher equity market 
dependence between European countries and industries around the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers. Moreover, we find that the European sovereign debt crisis 
substantially slowed the increase in equity market dependence for most industries. 
The latter holds particularly true for industries in high-risk countries such as Greece, 
suggesting that country-specific factors may matter more than before. 
Specifically, the change of European market dependence depends mainly on an 
industry‟s export intensity and interest rate sensitivity, where higher export intensity 
and interest rate sensitivity are associated with a stronger propensity to exhibit an 
increase in dependence. In addition, an industry‟s competitiveness and a country‟s 
financial development and economic openness are also (but less strongly) related to 
the change in cross-market dependence. These results have important policy 
implications since the identified determinants of dependence such as export intensity, 
competitiveness or financial development can be affected by policy. To illustrate, the 
current discussions between the European Union and the United States about the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) should affect the exports and 
competitiveness of firms in the Euro area and thus the level of dependence or 
integration. 
These new findings with regard to the impact of the Euro on financial market 
dependence in Europe in general and on different industries in particular complement 
prior studies on macroeconomic determinants of financial market dependence / 
integration.  
European equity market dependence 
The introduction of the Euro as a common currency was a project drawn up by the 
leaders of the EU to advance the goal of a closer union among European countries. It 
was identified by the Delors Report as a further step toward the creation of a single 
European market in order to create price stability, reduce costs of business, and 
promote economic performance by reducing barriers to the flow of labor, goods, 
services, and, particularly, capital across national borders. The ultimate goal of this 
process is the creation of one single European economy, where resource allocation 
across national borders is as easily done as in any other national economy of 
comparable size (e.g., the U.S. economy), with concomitant benefits in terms of more 
efficient allocation of resources and risk sharing. As recommended by the Delors 
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Report submitted in 1989 and adopted by the leaders of the EU member states, a 
multistage process started in 1990, leading to the adoption of the Euro as common 
currency. The first group of countries to join the Euro was announced in January 
1998, and the common currency was introduced in January 1999. 
Since its introduction, the Euro has had significant economic effects along many 
different dimensions. With regard to the real sector, the Euro has been attributed to 
the promotion of competition, trade, capital investment, and the alignment of the 
national Euro-area business cycles. These effects suggest higher levels of economic 
integration than prior to the Euro, which has also led to increased cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions. 
In particular, the introduction of the Euro has caused yield curves to converge within 
the Euro area. As a result, capital market financing has become more important due 
to the convergence of nationally segregated financial markets  towards the standards 
of the most sophisticated, liquid markets. The overall effect has been a reduction in 
the cost of capital within the Euro area, which is typically interpreted as a sign of 
increasing capital market integration and which has been attributed to general 
reductions in the exposure to exchange rate and market risk. This has led to 
increased cross-border investment flows within European financial markets and the 
reorganization of hitherto country-based portfolios toward industrial sectors by 
institutional investors. 
 
7. The case of sovereign debt of stressed euro-area countries 
Unraveling the Ariadne‟s thread of the euro area debt crisis and its far reaching 
implications is by no means an easy task. During the crisis several euro area 
countries were put under financial stress and under enormous pressure to finance 
their debt, while other countries, as a result of investors‟ flight to safety, were faced 
with unprecedented low debt-servicing cost. By December 2009, when it became 
clear that Greece was significantly constrained from accessing the sovereign debt 
markets, and especially after May 2010 when Greece received financial assistance 
from euro area countries and the IMF, concerns about debt financing spread to the 
rest of fiscally vulnerable southern euro area countries and Ireland. Subsequently, 
sovereign bond spreads and Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) of stressed euro area 
countries increased dramatically during the crisis, exhibiting also elevated volatility. 
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It is essential to build on the notion of market frictions and thereby on „basis‟ to reveal 
market preferences with respect to sovereign debt markets in the euro area. In 
particular, we must test whether market preferences are symmetric and thereby 
market participants attach equal weight to both positive „basis‟ and negative „basis‟. 
In case that deviations from symmetry would be observed that would indicate that 
market underlying preference leaning towards a „basis‟ with certain sign and thereby 
leaning towards a specific trading strategy. 
Overall, our empirical evidence shows that market preferences shift towards 
pessimism, notably for Greece post the first bail out programme in spring 2010.  
Such breaks could be caused by unexpected events, but also policy interventions to 
address the crisis, which could alter the shape of the loss function, and thereby 
market preferences. We also examine the impact of fiscal and financial factors on 
market preferences. The evidence finds that fiscal fundamentals such as outstanding 
debt ratio, but also fiscal governance such as fiscal rules, drive market preferences. 
In addition, corporate credit risk affects market preferences over sovereign debt in 
the short run.  
In spring 2007 there was hardly any evidence of the subsequent turbulence in 
sovereign bond markets in the euro-area. At the time, the yields of sovereign bonds 
across euro area Member States appeared to be converging. In fact, in July 2007 the 
yield of the 10-year German sovereign bond was somewhat lower than the Irish 
equivalent. However, this situation changed dramatically with the advent of the global 
financial crisis. As investors fled to safety, German bonds became more appealing to 
them than bonds of fiscally exposed economies within the euro area. As a result 
these countries faced the reality of rising borrowing costs. By December 2009 it 
became clear that Greece was significantly constrained from accessing the markets 
in order to finance its sovereign debt. The Greek sovereign bonds spread over five 
years maturity reached 215 basis points above the swap rate at the end of December 
2009. The equivalent spread for Ireland was about 45 basis points and 28 basis 
points for Portugal. In spring 2010, Greece requested financial assistance from the 
EU and the IMF as spreads and CDS reached record high levels and borrowing from 
the market was hardly possible. Greek spreads continued to rise despite financial 
assistance was provided, reaching 1100 basis points in March 2011, whilst contagion 
effects to Irish and Portuguese spreads meant that their sovereign spreads hiked to 
772 basis points and 636 basis points respectively. Regarding the borrowing cost of 
Spain and Italy the situation deteriorated in 2011 as the contagion from the Greek 
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sovereign debt crisis also affected them. The first financial assistance programme to 
Greece was designed to contain the crisis. 
But, the programme proved to be rather insufficient to deal with the chronic rigidities 
and anachronistic structures of the Greek economy that had led to the crisis. As a 
result, the Greek spread reached values close 6000 basis points in the first quarter of 
2012 prior to the Private Sector Involvement (PSI). In spring 2012, an unprecedented 
haircut to private investors in Greek sovereign bonds took place of the value of 100 
billion euros. 
As in the case of spreads, CDS for the euro area countries in the periphery follows 
similar trends, though they reached values above spreads in the pick of the 
sovereign debt crisis in the euro area, prior to the Greek PSI. It is interesting to note 
that prior to the euro area sovereign debt crisis sovereign CDS had been rather 
neglected. Alas, the surge in Greek CDS in 2010 enhanced the importance of 
sovereign CDS market for the euro area. A plethora of factors that contribute towards 
high CDS have ben put forward. Declining risk appetite, falling market liquidity, short-
term expectations, imminent increases in sovereign bond issuance, and credit rating 
downgrades, that is migration risk, all raise CDS. Economic catastrophe risk might be 
the main underlying drive of high CDS.  
However, the challenge is to quantify such animal spirits, to quantify market 
behaviour. It is most crucial to posses a way of revealing sovereign market 
preferences in the euro area, and thus a way of decoding market behaviour and fit a 
loss function based on the „basis‟ to reveal market preferences over the debt of euro 
area countries under stress. The reported evidence shows that the market remained 
rather pessimistic, despite the bail out of Greece in spring 2010 and the Portuguese 
and Irish bail out thereafter, over prospects of effectively dealing with the euro area 
debt crisis. In fact, all evidence shows that the sovereign debt market shifted 
preferences to higher levels of pessimism over time, and in particular for periods post 
Greek and Portuguese bail out, whilst outstanding debt and fiscal governance played 
a key role in affecting those preferences. The observed asymmetries in the market‟s 
loss function reveal that this pessimism is warranted as a sequence of bail out 
programmes by EU, ECB and IMF has clearly failed to reassure the market that the 
euro area debt crisis is over. 
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Instead, policy interventions that aim at reducing the outstanding debt and 
strengthening fiscal rules as a way to raise market‟s optimism regarding the ongoing 
euro-area debt crisis should be supported. Essentially, revealing market preferences 
in the aftermath of a policy intervention would act as an early warning mechanism of 
assessing the effectiveness, and thus credibility, of such intervention. In the case that 
the revealed market preferences indicate that the effectiveness of such intervention 
is questionable, this would assert peer pressure that would enhance efforts towards 
fiscal consolidation and sustainability in a timely manner. 
 
8. Evidence from the Greek sovereign bonds market 
Since the inception of the common currency, European Monetary Union (EMU) 
countries have experienced a convergence of their long-term interest rates. The 
establishment of the EMU created expectations among peripheral countries (such as 
Greece, Portugal, and Ireland) for sustainable economic growth due to the political 
and financial stability that the EMU introduced. The single currency implied a 
common monetary policy with very low interest rates set by the European Central 
Bank (ECB) that would be based initially on low German inflation rates. Thus, the 
countries with high inflation rates at that time (Greece, Portugal, and others) gained 
credibility from this. However, this loose monetary policy prevented the inflation rates 
of these countries from converging with the EU average inflation rate over time. This 
situation created problems such as a lack of competitiveness and the deterioration of 
their fiscal balances.  
In 2007, after the bursting of the subprime mortgage bubble, the world long-term 
interest rates increased. As some authors claim, the fundamental macroeconomics of 
each country were the primary reason for this increase. On the other hand, many 
authors argue that the increased volatility of the European government bond yields 
was a result of a contagious effect from the Greek crisis. This was hypothesized 
because Greece was the first country that claimed financial support from the EU and 
the IMF, in May 2010. Greece‟s twin deficits, macroeconomic imbalance, and its 
unsustainable debt path were the main concerns of the international financial 
community due to a possible contagion to other European countries.  
The results of all the methods considered do not confirm the hypothesis of 
contagious effects stemming from the 10-year Greek bond to the periphery or the 
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core European countries. On the contrary, it is evident that there is a decoupling in 
the correlation dynamics between the yields of the PIIGs (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, 
Greece, and Spain) and the yields of the core eurozone. This result is in line with 
previous findings of the bond determinants literature that, for the first time since the 
inception of the euro currency, market practitioners began to pay attention to the 
macro fundamentals of each country and separately evaluate each EU country‟s 
sovereign debt market. The debate over the existence or not of contagion effects 
from Greece could be augmented by examining any possible spread of the Greek 
crisis to the newly evolving shadow banking system, which would include securitized 
bonds repurchase agreements. 
 
9. The double hazard of underinvestment and unemployment in the Euro 
area 
A worrisome characteristic of the euro area is the massive fall in overall investment 
activity. Gross fixed capital formation in the core euro area is nearly 20% below the 
share in GDP it had in 2007, the year before the global financial crisis erupted. In 
contrast, investment activity in other economies such as the US, Japan or the non-
Euro Nordic countries has been steadily recovering since 2010. The fact that 
investment activity as a share of GDP is declining while the latter remained sluggish 
after the crisis implies that the reduction of capital investment in volume terms is 
even more pronounced in the euro area relative to the other economies. Moreover, 
the fact that investment in Germany is approaching its pre-crisis intensity means that 
the rest of the euro area economies suffer an even larger toll. 
However alarming such developments might have sounded elsewhere, they failed to 
grasp the attention of European policy makers. Too preoccupied with stemming off 
the debt crisis as they were, European authorities insisted on the priority of fiscal 
rehabilitation across member states as a condition for the return of growth in the 
monetary union. But despite the fiscal progress achieved by the debt-stricken 
economies and the unprecedented monetary ease offered by the European Central 
Bank (ECB), the signs of recovery remained dim and this –at long last– led to a focus 
on the issue of underinvestment in the euro area. 
Many researchers acknowledge that investment activity in the euro area was lagging 
far behind other advanced economies even before the financial crisis. For the euro 
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area to have stayed at a par with other advanced economies, they estimate that that 
it should have invested more than €7. 5 trillion over the period 1999-2007. As a 
matter of fact, the gap not only didn‟t close but has since been further widened. The 
collapse of investment activity is found to be more worrisome in the debtstressed 
countries of the euro area periphery as a result of falling demand and front-loaded 
fiscal consolidation. Additionally, social tensions generated by the austerity programs 
create a multitude of political and economic uncertainties that hinder potential 
investment plans..  
At the same time, an unprecedented rise in unemployment is ravaging the euro area. 
In comparison with the same group of countries as before, the euro area is found to 
be the only large economy, where unemployment has thus far exceeded the pre-
crisis level by more than half, remains double-digit and is still rising. Again, the fact 
that unemployment is being reduced in Germany implies a much bleaker situation for 
the rest of the euro area members. 
By juxtaposing developments in unemployment and net fixed capital formation over 
the period 1991-2014, an impressive mirror pattern emerges. A strong negative 
correlation between unemployment and total investment is established and the same 
holds for its components of the private sector or the General Government. This 
suggests that a deeper link might exist between the twin malaises in the euro area 
and is worth further investigation. 
The issue is not a novel one and the relationship between capital investment and 
equilibrium unemployment has been extensively debated in the literature over the 
last two decades. Equilibrium unemployment is increasing with union power and 
unemployment benefits, decreasing with product market competition, but remains 
totally unaffected by changes in the capital-labour ratio. The implication was that 
capital-inducing policies are ineffective in addressing high levels of unemployment, 
and it is only the implementation of labour market reforms that could bring it down in 
the long run. Both the assumptions and the neutrality thesis were subsequently 
challenged by several empirical and theoretical studies that continue to the present 
day. 
The interactions between investment and unemployment became the subject of 
controversy in the US as well. Taylor (2011) produced a striking negative correlation 
between the two and suggested that “[e]ncouraging the creation and expansion of 
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businesses should be the focus on government efforts to reduce unemployment.” In 
contrast, Krugman (2014) argued that the finding is an artifact brought about by the 
bust in residential investment after the global crisis and asserted that causation more 
likely runs from unemployment to capital formation rather than the other way around. 
Quite often, the debate was laden with theoretical or even ideological interpretations. 
Thus, the real issue is to investigate whether and to which extent unemployment can 
be influenced by investment activity.  
 
Equilibrium unemployment is affected by capital investment as long as the elasticity 
of substitution between capital and labour is not too low. In the euro area it is shown 
that wage shares have not remained constant over the last two decades, thus the 
investment impact on unemployment is expected to be strong. A cross-country 
estimate of unemployment equations finds the investment effect to be correctly 
signed and statistically significant, in contrast to the weak effect that labour market 
reforms seem to play in promoting employment. The estimates can be used to 
calculate the investment gap in the euro area and determine how much of a new 
initiative on private and public investment is needed to restore employment. 
Future research will differentiate between private and public investment and examine 
the optimal capital accumulation paths in the presence of fiscal constraints in each 
particular country. On the econometric side, the use of other economic variables 
(e.g., interest rates, money supply, etc) as alternative instruments is going to be 
examined as long as they qualify as exogenous to the model. Alternative estimation 
methods that bypass the use of instrumental variables, such as (conditional) 
Maximum Likelihood may also be employed after an explicit parameterization of the 
endogenous relationships in the model. 
 
10. Reflections of corruption and tax evasion on the Greek tragedy 
Corruption and the misuse of government revenue often provide the moral 
justification for tax evasion. Indeed, corruption and tax evasion are often highly 
persistent and correlated. For example, there seems to be little disagreement to the 
claim that the current Greek economic tragedy is a play that involves both of these 
issues. 
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Political corruption, evidenced by a series of scandals, together with massive tax 
evasion and low quality of public services have been the case in Greece for at least 
the last three decades. This extensive corruption has resulted in a decline in social 
capital, a mutual distrust between citizens and the government and a social 
legitimization of tax evasion and bribery. We aim to focus on the role of norms in 
fostering corruption and tax evasion and argue that various manifestations of 
corruption may coexist and reinforce each other. The corrupt behavior of one group 
may become a strategic complement for another. In such a context, whenever agents 
expect other agents to be corrupt, they always find it optimal to be corrupt as well. An 
example of such a vicious circle is that of widespread political corruption and high tax 
evasion. We can say that there is a model economy that comprises two distinct 
groups of agents: private citizens and politicians. Citizens decide how much of their 
income to report to the tax authorities, taking into account the exogenously given 
probability of inspection and the size of the delinquent tax penalty. A certain fraction 
of tax revenue is supposed to be spent for the provision of a public good. Politicians, 
on the other hand, have the opportunity to peculate a certain fraction of the public 
funds that are earmarked for the public good. Crucially, each agent cares not only 
about her own consumption, but also about the quantity/quality of the public good. 
In such a context, strategic complementarities may arise, leading to multiple self- 
fulfilling equilibria: a .good.(.bad.) equilibrium with low (high) corruption, low (high) 
percentage of tax evasion and a high (low) share of output spent on the public good. 
The existence of multiple equilibria can help us understand why countries with similar 
background are characterized by different levels of corruption and tax evasion. It can 
also provide some insights as to why these two phenomena are so difficult to 
eradicate. 
We show that in the presence of multiple equilibria driven by strategic 
complementarities in corrupt activities, standard policies, such as fines, are not fully 
effective. The reason is that whereas standard deterrence policies may increase the 
cost of tax evasion and corruption, they are unsuccessful in eliminating the strategic 
complementarity between groups. 
We then assume social stigma costs associated with being involved in corrupt 
activities, i.e., individuals who commit unlawful actions and get caught are 
stigmatized by society. If this social cost is sufficiently high, then the multiplicity of 
equilibria is eliminated and the economy converges to a unique equilibrium. The 
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intuition behind the success of social stigma in eliminating the multiplicity of equilibria 
lies in that it effectively addresses the strategic complementarity aspect of corruption. 
Existing evidence suggests that there is a positive correlation between corruption and 
tax evasion. The two of them often coexist and reinforce each other. Moreover, there 
seems to be a negative correlation between these two phenomena and spending on 
publicly provided goods, such as education and health. 
Policies that raise the social cost of participation in corrupt activities are most 
important. These policies are particularly useful in the presence of multiple equilibria 
as an equilibrium selection mechanism, since they can put an end to strategic 
complementarity in corrupt activities. 
Another strand of the related literature has highlighted the fact that countries with 
similar fiscal systems and deterrence policies often exhibit different levels of 
compliance. To explain such differences, researchers have introduced some form of 
moral costs related to tax evasion. 
Among the main conclusions of the literature are that, first, non-evading individuals 
are the ones that view tax evasion as immoral; and, second, individuals who have 
friends that evade taxes tend to evade more themselves. In addition, the literature 
finds that, in societies with a stronger feeling of social cohesion, tax compliance is 
higher, as well as that social norms are a crucial determinant of tax evasion.  
Whether a policy will be successfully implemented or not depends on many factors 
that cannot be easily accounted for in a model, not even for standard policies such as 
fines and auditing probabilities. We assume that if an agent is audited and exposed 
as an evader (embezzler) she (he) suffers from an internal moral cost. Interestingly, 
we found that, in the presence of a sufficiently high cost, we can eliminate the 
multiplicity of equilibria. Strategic substitutability implies that it is too costly for agents 
to follow the other agents strategies. 
What are the policies that a government can adopt in order to increase the moral 
costs associated with being involved in corrupt activities? A wide range of 
governmental-induced policies can contribute to a change in the culture of paying 
taxes. Some of these policies include: the instrumental use of the mass media in 
order to highlight the ethical aspects of tax compliance and at the same time to 
increase peer pressure on tax evaders (e.g., publicizing individual tax returns or 
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pronounced cases of tax evasion); abolishing policies that signal that non-compliance 
is socially acceptable, such as tax amnesties; highlighting the direct link between tax 
compliance, tax revenue and the public services associated with it; the instrumental 
use of a number of organizations in the fight against corruption so as to further 
reinforce compliance as the ethical pattern of behavior; and addressing perceived 
inequities in the way people feel they are treated. 
Several of these measures have been adopted in a large number of countries. No-
table examples are Sweden, Norway and Finland, where individual income tax filings 
are publicly available. In California, the names of the top 500 delinquent taxpayers 
are published on the internet annually. Also, the U.S. Attorneys office in the district 
where a case is prosecuted normally issues a press release when a tax evader is 
indicted, once he or she is convicted, and again when the evader is sentenced. 
In New Zealand, the Commissioner of Inland Revenue regularly releases the Tax 
Evaders Gazette, which lists those taxpayers, individuals and companies, who have 
been prosecuted or had penal tax or shortfall penalties imposed for evading their tax 
obligations. Several other countries follow similar practices. 
In India, a tax collection campaign took place in 1997, which was highly successful 
and brought a substantial increase in revenue, mostly because the state had hired 
two marketing companies that used moral suasion to increase tax compliance. 
A web site was later created that received almost 22,500 reports between the years 
2010 and 2012. This policy contributed not only to an increase in arrests and 
convictions, but also to a public reward for honest officials. Also, in the Philippines, 
approximately 1 million scouts were recruited and worked with the government in 
order to conduct inspections throughout the country. 
Finally, an extensive campaign for the creation of a tax compliance culture took place 
in Israel during the period 1938-1960. Before 1948, Palestine was under British 
mandate. While compliance with British tax law was low and tax evasion was 
encouraged, the Jewish community of Palestine had established a series of voluntary 
taxes, designed to finance mainly military operations. Among the means used to 
induce compliance with the community taxes were special movies, slogans, posters, 
public conferences, lectures, etc. 
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Overall, the purpose of actions such as those mentioned above is to increase the 
moral cost, via the use of peer pressure, and eventually to inculcate a culture of tax 
compliance. Of course, reinforcing tax morale, through such measures, needs time to 
yield results. Yet, not only can it have long-lasting effects, but it can also increase the 
effectiveness of standard enforcement policies. 
Motivated by the ongoing Greek economic tragedy, which we partly view as the 
outcome of strategic complementarities in corrupt actions among different societal 
groups, we analyzed the issues of political corruption and tax evasion in the context 
of a simple economy with a publicly provided good. We showed that strategic 
complementarities may arise among agents, which lead to the existence of two 
stable equilibria. One of these equilibria is characterized by high rates of corruption 
and tax evasion and a low level of the public good, while the other equilibrium 
exhibits low rates of corruption and tax evasion and a high level of the public good. 
We must point out the effectiveness of different policies in reducing the rates of 
evasion/embezzlement as well as their ability to eliminate the multiplicity and resolve 
a possible coordination failure. To this extent, we showed first that standard 
deterrence policies, i.e., changes in the probabilities of being caught or in the penalty 
rates, can reduce the rates of evasion/embezzlement, but cannot eliminate the 
multiplicity of equilibria. Of course, this result is also consistent with a variety of 
similar approaches that go beyond enforcement to incorporate trust and other similar 
notions, e.g., intrinsic motivation, tax morale, slippery slope, deference versus 
defiance, etc. We used the concept of stigma to illustrate our point that the 
establishment of strong moral values can be a crucial supplement to deterrence 
policies. In other words, we do not question the importance of fines imposed on tax 
evaders and corrupt politicians. After all, if a person otherwise inclined to evade 
taxes, or to embezzle public funds has internalized the social stigma, his behavior will 
respond in usual ways to changes in fines, i.e., he or she will evade or embezzle less 
when fines increase. 
There is first a correlation between attitudes towards tax evasion and perceived 
political corruption and second a causal effect from perceived political corruption to 
tax evasion. 
Finally, individuals are more likely to respond either to enforcement or to tax services 
if they believe that the tax administration is honest; that is, if trust in the authorities 
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can have a positive impact on compliance. Nevertheless, we think that in practice the 
establishment of such a trust in societies with a high level of corruption is extremely 
difficult. Hence, these results can explain the persistence of corruption and tax 
evasion and the difficulty that often honest leaders face when trying to eradicate 
them. 
 
11. An analytic overview of the crisis in the Euro area 
The year 2009 was the tenth anniversary of the creation of the euro. Throughout the 
year, academic conferences were held to celebrate what at that time was widely 
considered to be the success of the boldest attempt ever by diverse sovereign states 
to reap the efficiency gains of a single currency. Despite the earlier misgivings of 
some economists about the feasibility of a common currency in Europe, by 2009 
evidence of the euro‟s success was plentiful. The euro had created a low-inflation, 
low-interest-rate environment (even for formerly high-inflation countries) conducive to 
sustainable growth. It had fostered trade integration and the integration of financial 
(and, to some extent, labor and commodity) markets among the members of the euro 
area. The number of participating countries had risen from eleven in 1999 to sixteen 
in 2009. Notwithstanding the eruption of the global financial crisis in August 2007 and 
its intensification in September 2008 with the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the euro 
area had been relatively unscathed by the effects of that crisis. To mark the euro‟s 
tenth anniversary, at the end of 2009 the European Commission published a study 
that sought to explain the reasons the skeptics of the single currency could have 
been so misled in their assessment of the euro‟s feasibility. 
Yet, amidst the celebrations in 2009, in Greece a shock was unfolding that, by the 
end of the year, would materialize into a full-blown financial crisis. During the ensuing 
years, the euro crisis broadened and deepened, threatening the sustainability of 
Europe‟s common currency. What had started as a sovereign-debt crisis in Greece 
spilled over to that country‟s banking system, creating twin crises. In other euro-area 
countries, including Ireland, Spain and Cyprus, the crises originated in the banking 
systems and spilled over to the sovereign debt. While at the time of this writing 
(August 2013) the euro-area crisis is by no means over (although it has subsided 
considerably), the events of the past four years provide the opportunity to take stock 
of what went wrong and what can be done to prevent future crises in the euro area. 
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In order to gain a better understanding of the issues involved, on May 23-24, 2013 
the Bank of Greece held a conference on “The Crisis in the Euro Area.” The papers 
presented at the conference examined two main sets of issues. One group of papers, 
adopting a union-wide perspective, assessed the aspects of the euro area‟s 
institutional architecture that, with the benefit of hindsight, may have contributed to 
the crisis, and the policy responses to the crisis at the union level. A second group of 
papers focused on developments in three crisis countries -- Greece, Ireland, and 
Portugal. This issue of the Journal of Macroeconomics is comprised of the papers 
presented at the Bank of Greece conference and the discussions of those papers at 
the conference. 
The adjustment mechanism 
An underlying feature of the euro-area countries that have been hit by crises is that 
they experienced large and growing current-account deficits in the years leading up 
to the crises. At the time of the inception of the euro area, a prevailing view was that 
current-account imbalances among participating countries should not be a major 
concern in a monetary union. Underlying this view is the idea that intertemporal utility 
maximization helps ensure that diverging current-account positions are the natural 
consequence of a convergence process among countries with different levels of 
economic development. In the presence of integrated markets, countries with 
relatively-low per capita income, such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, should 
attract capital inflows because of high productivity growth and relatively-high rates of 
return. As long as (i) the investment financed by the capital inflows provides a rate of 
return that exceeds the cost of borrowing (so that the accumulated foreign liabilities 
can be repaid) and (ii) any increased consumption associated with the imbalance is 
temporary and desirable for purposes of intertemporal consumption smoothing, 
current-account deficits in a monetary union (according to this view) are nothing to 
worry about. 
Outbreak of the Greek crisis 
Greece‟s current-account deficit swelled from 11.5 per cent of GDP in 2001 (the year 
in which Greece joined the euro area) to 18 per cent in 2008. Under a well-
functioning fixed-exchange-rate regime (and in the absence of a fiscal-transfer 
mechanism), such large and sustained external deficits are not expected to occur. 
For example, under the classical gold standard of the late-19th and early 20th 
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centuries, countries that experienced current-account deficits would typically 
experience gold outflows, and, with money and credit growth tied to gold, lower 
money and credit growth. The lower money and credit growth would cause prices 
and wages to fall (or would lead to reductions in the growth rates of prices and 
wages), helping to restore competitiveness, thus eliminating the external deficits. 
Conversely, countries with current-account surpluses would typically experience 
inflows of gold, which led to rises in money and credit growth, pushing up prices. The 
appreciation of the real exchange rate would help eliminate the current-account 
surpluses. 
Greece‟s experience during the period 2001-2009 demonstrates what happens when 
a fixed-exchange-rate regime does not work satisfactorily. Although the country‟s 
large current-account deficits signaled a competitiveness problem, capital continued 
to flow into the country until 2008-2009, pushing up money and credit growth, which, 
in turn, increased inflation and caused competitiveness to deteriorate further. During 
the period 2001-2009, annual money growth averaged 8.8 per cent in Greece; credit 
growth to the private sector rose by 16.7 per cent a year. During that  period, 
Greece‟s current-account deficit averaged 13.4 per cent a year. In contrast, for 
Germany, which had an average current-account surplus of 4.4 per cent during the 
period 2001-2009, M3 growth averaged 5.7 per year, and credit growth to the private 
sector averaged 2.7 per cent a year. The relative flows of money and credit led to a 
15 per cent appreciation of Greece‟s real exchange rate (in terms of consumer 
prices) relative to that of Germany. Since Greece and Germany shared a common 
currency, the appreciation of Greece‟s real exchange rate relative to that of Germany 
was entirely due to movements in relative prices. 
The rise in Greek inflation caused the real interest rate to fall, leading to more 
borrowing. Increased government borrowing led to deterioration in competitiveness 
through two main channels. First, to the extent that Greek producers provide 
differentiated tradable goods -- for example, Greek islands are not perfect substitutes 
for non-Greek tourist destinations -- the producers face a negatively-sloped demand 
curve (since they produce a differentiated good). In this situation, a rise in prices 
leads to a reduction in the quantity demanded of tradeable goods (that is, a 
movement along the demand curve rather than a shift in the demand curve) -- Greek 
products lose competitiveness. Second, as the government borrowed (and spent) 
more, it pushed up the prices of non-traded goods relative to traded goods. Wages in 
the non-traded-goods sector rose relative to wages in the traded-goods sector. The 
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former increases, in turn, spilled over to the traded-goods sector, creating a “Dutch-
disease” effect under which the increase in costs in some sectors spills over into 
other sectors. To the extent that the prices in those other sectors could not absorb 
the increase in costs, because, for example, prices could not be increased due to 
international competition and/or productivity growth was insufficient to offset the rise 
in costs, there was a loss of international competitiveness.  
Correspondingly, the current-account deficits led to a build-up of (mainly) government 
debt. The stock of Greek government debt essentially doubled between 2001 and 
2009, rising from € 151.9 billion to € 299.7 billion; during the same period, the share 
of Greek sovereign debt held by non-residents jumped from 43.4 per cent to 78.7 per 
cent. In 2009 the markets recognized that Greece‟s debt dynamics were not 
sustainable; there was a sudden stop of capital inflows and the Greek sovereign 
crisis was underway. 
The adjustment process did not operate in the euro zone because for many years 
investors did not draw a distinction between the sovereign debt of the core countries 
and the sovereign debt of the peripheral countries, such as Greece. Instead, in the 
years preceding the outbreak of the Greek sovereign-debt crisis, investors pushed 
interest rates on Greek (and other) sovereigns down to near German sovereign 
levels . Prior to 2008-2009, the markets failed to incorporate Greece‟s deteriorating 
fundamentals into the price of Greek sovereigns. Consequently, there was no 
mechanism to adjust money and credit growth, and Greece and other countries were 
able to run large, current-account and fiscal deficits on a sustained basis without 
taking remedial policy measures. 
North versus South 
A similar conclusion emerges in a comparison of the current-account positions of 
euro-area crisis countries as a group with (selected) euro-area northern countries as 
a group. 
First, in monetary unions comprised of sovereign states that have not mutualized a 
guarantee on public debt, current-account deficits matter. 
Second, a well-functioning monetary union requires a well-functioning adjustment 
mechanism. To ensure that the adjustment mechanism is effective, the institutional 
design of the union needs to include mechanisms mandating that participants will 
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take measures that eliminate the external imbalances. In this connection, a new 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) was put in place in December 2011 with 
the aim of preventing and correcting macroeconomic and competitiveness 
imbalances among all EU countries. The MIP seeks to identify potential risks of 
imbalances early on so as to prevent the emergence of unsustainable imbalances 
and correct imbalances already in place. To do so, the MIP relies on a graduated 
approach that reflects the gravity of imbalances. Sustained imbalances can 
eventually lead to the imposition of sanctions on euro-area Member States, should 
they repeatedly fail to meet their obligations under the MIP. Additionally, on 20 
February 2013, the EU Council, the European Parliament and the European 
Commission reached agreement on two EU regulations -- the so-called “two-pack”. 
One regulation aims to prevent the build-up of significant fiscal imbalances by 
strengthening the economic and budgetary surveillance of euro-area member states 
and improving policy coordination among those states. The other regulation 
enhances economic and financial surveillance of euro-area member states 
threatened with “serious financial difficulties” (Council of the European Union, 2013). 
The costs of adjustment 
As mentioned above, a major cost of monetary unions is the reduced flexibility to 
adjust to asymmetric shocks. In the face of such shocks, real-exchange-rate 
adjustments in individual countries need to be brought about entirely through 
adjustments of domestic prices and wages, that is, through internal devaluations. The 
euro-area crisis has shown, however, that it is more difficult to effectuate the needed 
adjustments in the present environment than had been assumed in the earlier 
literature on monetary integration. 
Several factors have contributed to this situation. 
• The earlier literature was written against a backdrop of higher inflation, both in 
Europe and globally. With the decline in inflation to the low single digits in the euro 
area, it has become more difficult to achieve a given internal devaluation. For 
example, if inflation in a monetary union averages one per cent a year, a country that 
needs to regain price competitiveness of the order of ten per cent will need to run a 
zero inflation rate for ten years. If, however, inflation in the monetary union averages 
two per cent a year, that same country, by running a zero inflation rate, will have 
recovered its competitiveness in five years. Thus, an internal devaluation may be 
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slow and costly (in terms of output loss and a rise in unemployment) in a monetary 
union that features a very-low inflation rate. Everything else held equal, the lower the 
average inflation rate in a country‟s trading partners, the slower and more costly an 
internal devaluation. 
• Rose (2000) presented evidence indicating that a monetary union leads to 
increased trade among the members of the union (over and above those derived 
from the elimination of any exchange-rate uncertainty stemming from fixed exchange 
rates among separate currencies). Several conclusions emerged from this evidence. 
(1) Since monetary union encourages trade integration, it also leads to greater 
business-cycle correlation (through the higher trade linkages) among the members of 
the union. (2) A corollary of greater business-cycle correlation is that monetary union 
itself will make asymmetric shocks between countries less likely, reducing the 
advantage of a country-specific monetary policy. 
• Two comments are in order. First, a main casualty of the euro-area crisis is the idea 
that trade criterion effects could reduce asymmetries among countries in a monetary 
union. Instead, increased trade integration appears to lead to regional concentration 
of industrial activities. The basic reason here is that trade integration tends to lead to 
agglomeration effects under which production becomes relatively cheaper (due, for 
example, to the access of firms to pools of skilled labor, which, in turn, provides 
employment opportunities to labor) in areas where there has been a clustering of 
economic activity. These agglomeration economies, in turn, make it profitable to 
concentrate production so that firms can benefit from (external) economies of scale.  
Consequently, any trade-creation effects of the euro appear to have led to reduced -- 
instead of increased -- business-cycle synchronization. Second, to the extent that the 
euro has resulted in greater intra-euro trade, the larger is the magnitude of real 
exchange rate adjustment that needs to take place without the benefit of a nominal 
adjustment. As mentioned above, in a monetary union that features a very-low 
inflation rate, an internal devaluation is slow and costly. The larger the share of intra-
union trade among the participants, the larger that part of trade that can regain 
competitiveness only through an internal devaluation. 
• The crisis countries have had to undertake large fiscal consolidations. The earlier 
literature assumed that a given fiscal adjustment was associated with a fixed fiscal 
multiplier. However, recent work on fiscal multipliers has indicated that the multipliers 
are considerably higher in a crisis environment than in more tranquil situations. 
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Several factors account for this circumstance. First, fiscal multipliers tend to be 
higher than otherwise when economies are in recessions and there is a great deal of 
slack in an economy. Second, in situations of very low nominal interest rates, central 
banks have limited scope to reduce policy rates to offset the contractionary effects of 
fiscal consolidation on real economic activity. 
Third, in relatively-closed economies, such as the Greek economy, fiscal multipliers 
tend to be larger than in more open economies. Any decline in demand hits 
domestically-produced goods more than imports. The decline in demand for domestic 
production, then, affects output more than if the economy were more open. 
Consequently, fiscal consolidations in crises countries have featured moving targets 
as efforts to reduce deficits have had especially large effects on income, reducing 
revenues, and necessitating further fiscal consolidations. 
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EMU 2.0  
DRAWING LESSONS FROM THE CRISIS - A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR 
STABILITY AND GROWTH 
 
Was the strategy and specific actions to cope with the crisis appropriate? Was the 
priority given to preserving financial stability justified? Are stability and growth 
objectives possible in EMU 2.0? What is the scope for national economic policy in the 
new policy framework? 
Decisive initiatives by EU authorities, supported by significant progress to strengthen 
further economic and financial governance and reduce macroeconomic imbalances, 
succeeded in preserving the stability and integrity of the euro area. At the same time, 
some weaknesses in policy action were corrected with a shift in focus towards 
improving the soundness of the banking sector and moving towards a banking union.  
It is argued that the priority given by EU policy action to financial stability was fully 
justified. However, it is also clear that robust economic growth is essential for durable 
financial stability and, therefore, the creation of conditions for economic recovery and 
sustainable growth must be constant objectives of public policy. 
It is clear that policies enhancing both stability and growth are possible in EMU and 
include economic rebalancing, which will have broader positive implications than 
usually assumed, the banking union project, which is essential for financial stability 
and important for growth and new initiatives to achieve an integrated internal market. 
To the above should be added actions directly enhancing economic growth such as 
policies supporting private and public investment and more growth-enhancing 
policies at both central and national level. 
Although the crisis has not yet been overcome and some parts of the new legislation 
have not yet been fully implemented, it can be argued that there is ample scope for 
economic policy at national level, as weaknesses in EMU‟s architecture have been 
largely corrected and systemic risks greatly reduced. However, legacy problems, 
such as the excessive government debt burden in some countries, must be resolved. 
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1. The emergence of the sovereign debt crisis and its management 
Shortcomings in EMU‟s institutional framework did not allow timely preventive action 
before the emergence of the crisis and, also, complicated corrective action when the 
crisis occurred. From the analysis of the overall management of the sovereign debt 
crisis and the specific action undertaken to contain and overcome it, useful lessons 
can be drawn for the design of public policy in the future at EU and national level. 
The sovereign debt crisis emerged in economies with sizable imbalances and 
structural weaknesses…. 
The global financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009 was transformed in 2010 into 
a sovereign debt crisis in the euro area, hitting countries with sizeable 
macroeconomic imbalances and structural weaknesses. The crisis intensified in 2011 
and the first half of 2012 threatening the stability and integrity of the euro area. Both 
internal and external macroeconomic imbalances had been the main source of 
difficulties in Greece and Portugal, while banking sector weaknesses were sources of 
fragility in Ireland and Spain, not least because the necessary restructuring of banks 
in those countries impacted negatively on public finances, notably in Ireland. It is 
noted that the fiscal deficit in Greece reached 15.2% of GDP in 2009 and 
government debt 126.8% of GDP. In Portugal, fiscal and external imbalances were 
significant at the start of the sovereign debt crisis - though lower than those in 
Greece – but the very high private sector indebtedness (225% of GDP in 2009, 
compared to 122% of GDP in Greece) was contributing to financial fragility. 
Greece was the first euro area country to be hit by the sovereign debt crisis in early 
2010 followed by a number of other member states - Ireland and Portugal, in late 
2010 and mid-2011, respectively, Spain in 2012 and Cyprus in 2013. All countries 
faced serious weaknesses, different in each case, but with a common implication, 
difficulties in accessing international capital markets at normal financial terms. These 
economies, already seriously weakened by the global crisis, did not possess the 
necessary resilience and adaptability to overcome the sovereign debt crisis with their 
own means. Moreover, engulfed in the spiral of the crisis and its implications, they 
were unable to benefit from the recovery of the global economy and international 
trade in 2010, which followed the deep recession in 2009, as was the case of export-
oriented economies with sound fundamentals, Germany and Finland, for example. 
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While Germany and Finland recovered rapidly in 2010, recording GDP growth rates 
of 4.1% and 3.0%, respectively, up from strongly negative growth rates in 2009, 
economic recession in Greece deepened to -5.4% in 2010 and further to -8.9% in 
2011. In Ireland and Spain, real GDP growth rates continued to be negative in 2010 
but the recession was less deep than in 2009, while in Portugal it remained 
temporarily positive in 2010 but turned negative in the following three years. The euro 
area as a whole registered a positive growth rate in 2010 while the global economy 
recorded growth of 5.4%, up from 0.0% in 2009 and the volume of international trade 
in goods and services rose by an impressive 12.6% after a sharp fall (-10.6%) in 
2009. 
The euro area economy was recovering strongly enough in 2010 from the deep 
recession in 2009. This suggests that a better diagnosis of the causes and nature of 
the crisis and, as a consequence, its more appropriate management, including better 
designed EU/IMF economic programmes, could have led to the impact of the crisis 
being much less severe. Indeed, emerging evidence suggested that it was not just a 
fiscal crisis, as conventional wisdom at the start of the crisis thought, but one of a 
more diverse character, including an underlying banking crisis in a number of 
member countries. 
Shortcomings in EMU’s architecture did not allow timely preventive action and 
also complicated corrective action…. 
There is a convergence of views among policymakers, academics and other analysts 
that shortcomings of EMU institutional framework did not prevent the accumulation of 
sizeable macroeconomic imbalances and structural weaknesses within the euro area 
in the first decade of EMU. Furthermore, it complicated corrective action to contain 
and overcome the sovereign debt crisis once it emerged. 
However, in addition to institutional shortcomings, there were also weaknesses in the 
application of economic and fiscal rules. EMU‟s economic governance framework 
was certainly incomplete but not nonexistent. 
Two other factors seem to have played a significant role in the absence of effective 
preventive action. Firstly, EMU had fallen victim of its own success in generating 
growth and employment in its first decade and no obvious need, and pressure, was 
felt for corrective action in cases of unsustainable policies. 
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Secondly, and related to the first, the reluctance of some large member states to 
respect the common fiscal rules or face the consequences conveyed a message of 
laxity with regard to these rules with serious medium-term consequences. 
Regarding the first factor, robust GDP growth and employment creation in the euro 
area - 18 million jobs were created in the euro area in the first nine years of EMU, 4 
million more than in the USA - and easily-financed internal and external deficits led to 
an attitude of benign neglect. Until the emergence of the global crisis, there was no 
perception of a balance of payments constraint or funding risk for government debt. 
However, this perception was mistaken, as proved by events, and as was noted in 
earlier publications, analysing the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty. 
A characteristic example of the second factor was the attempt of France and 
Germany, in 2003, to postpone fulfilment of fiscal rules which required a correction of 
excessive government deficits. The attempt was partly neutralised following recourse 
by the Commission to the European Court of Justice and the judgment of the latter 
which led to the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact in 2005. 
The above weaknesses, both institutional and operational, were to a large extent 
corrected by the adoption of new legislation, mainly the “six-pack” and the “two-pack” 
in 2011 and 2013 respectively, and the “fiscal compact” by which the balanced 
budget rule, in structural terms, was introduced. Through the adoption of the new 
rules, surveillance and coordination of fiscal and economic policies were 
strengthened and the powers of the Commission to ensure the application of 
common rules reinforced, for example through the “reverse qualified majority rule” by 
which a Commission proposal is considered as accepted unless a qualified majority 
of the EU Council members are opposed to it. 
Interaction between the Greek sovereign debt crisis and the euro area crisis 
The Greek sovereign debt crisis and its management are crucial to understanding the 
dynamics of the euro area crisis, as Greece was the first member country in which 
the sovereign debt crisis emerged, an appropriate EU financial support mechanism 
did not exist and had to be created from scratch, while events were unfolding and 
uncertainty rising, threatening euro area‟s stability and integrity. Evidence shows that 
there was a close interaction between the management of the Greek sovereign debt 
crisis and the euro area financial and economic crisis which was rapidly taking on a 
systemic character. 
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On the one hand, uncertainties about the implementation of the Greek programme 
and risks of Greece‟s exit from the euro area, widely reported by international media, 
raised concerns about the sustainability and integrity of the euro area itself. 
On the other hand, controversies about key elements of the support mechanisms, for 
example the treatment of private investors on government debt (which led to the 
Deauville Agreement between France and Germany in October 2010) and doubts 
often publicly raised about the commitment of Greece‟s partners to fully defend its 
euro area membership, were adversely affecting the implementation of its EU/IMF 
economic programme. 
“Mixed results” was how the European Commission characterised the outcome from 
the implementation of the first Greek economic programme – a statement reflecting a 
significant reduction in the fiscal deficit but at the cost of much deeper economic 
recession and much higher government debt than projected in the programme. This 
outcome necessitated a new loan and increased the uncertainties for Greece and the 
euro area. 
The intergovernmental approach to integration: some merits but higher risks 
An important element of the crisis management at EU level but also of the European 
integration process more broadly, has been the tendency to rely on 
intergovernmental solutions, outside the legal framework of the EU. The European 
support mechanisms (EFSF and ESM), the Fiscal Compact (incorporated in the 
“treaty on stability, coordination and governance in emu”) and the Single Resolution 
Fund of the banking union project are examples of this tendency. According to the 
view of several stakeholders this is not the best way to proceed, as it privileges the 
weight of large and influential countries at the expense of a more acceptable 
“Community approach” which would strengthen the relative weight of European 
Institutions, such as the European Commission, which is the guardian of the Treaties 
and assigned the duty to promote the common interest. 
However, this intergovernmental approach may be seen as an inevitable second best 
enabling European integration to advance if a consensus to modify EU treaties 
cannot be formed. It is also true that the responsibilities of the European Commission 
were strengthened in some respects as, for example, in the economic and budgetary 
surveillance and in bank resolution decisions in the banking union project. 
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In conclusion, the intergovernmental nature of several major initiatives may not be a 
satisfactory development, but can provide a reasonable provisional compromise 
between the options of inertia and the movement ahead, provided that the 
intergovernmental treaties are eventually incorporated in the main body of EU 
legislation at a later stage  
 
2. A turning point in 2012 as ECB initiatives and a critical mass of reforms 
stabilised the euro area 
A turning point in the euro area sovereign debt crisis was reached in 2012 when it 
was realised that, in addition to the creation and activation of support mechanisms 
and strengthened fiscal and macroeconomic rules, decisive action was needed to 
neutralize the risks of euro area disintegration, break the vicious circle between 
banks and sovereigns and move towards a banking union. 
The commitment “to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro” was decisive… 
Indeed, in July 2012, the ECB President underlined in London the commitment that, 
within its mandate, “the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro”. In 
August, the ECB announced its readiness to undertake Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT) in secondary markets with regard to sovereign bonds in the euro 
area, and in September published details of the modalities for undertaking OMTs, 
aiming to dissipate “unfounded fears about the reversibility of the euro”. In previous 
months, in order to alleviate the funding constraints experienced by banks, the ECB 
continued to supply funding support using longer-term refinancing operations with 
exceptional maturities. In particular, the two three-year longer-term refinancing 
operations that were announced in December 2011 had a significant impact in 2012 
as they led to a net liquidity injection of around €500 billion. More recently, in January 
2015, the ECB announced a quantitative easing programme (“expanded asset 
purchase programme”) in order to address the risks of deflation 
….but a critical mass of economic governance reforms also helped.... 
It should be noted that a critical mass of EU economic governance reforms, notably 
concerning euro area countries, and progress in fiscal and macroeconomic 
adjustment at national level, were crucial elements in making the ECB‟s initiatives 
credible. In particular, conditional financial support by the ESM within an economic 
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programme supplied the appropriate framework for an eventual activation of the OMT 
programme. Moreover, the adoption by the European Council of a “plan towards a 
genuine EMU”16, with concrete steps to establish a banking union, provided a 
clearer long-term perspective for EMU and it was an essential element in regaining 
financial market confidence and stabilising expectations. 
… as well as a better understanding of the nature of the crisis… 
Moreover, there was a better understanding of the nature of the euro area crisis and 
a shift of focus towards improving the soundness and performance of the banking 
sector, strengthening its surveillance and breaking the vicious circle between banks 
and sovereigns. The determination to proceed towards banking union was the most 
visible sign of the new priorities. 
Progress in economic adjustment and reform in the programme countries contributed 
significantly to the overall effort to strengthen financial stability in the euro area and 
enhance its growth potential. In particular, the re-negotiation of the Greek economic 
programme which was put onto a new and more sustainable path was a positive 
element in this joint effort. 
More generally, economic policy in EMU was starting to be rethought, including in 
connection to EU/IMF economic programmes. An important impulse to the latter was 
the report and resolution of the European Parliament on the Troika and its operation 
(see below), in view of the elections for a new parliament in May 2014. This 
rethinking, while sticking to the need for sound macroeconomic and fiscal policies, 
includes a better articulated policy mix, of fiscal, financial and structural policies using 
effectively to this end the instruments put at the disposal of European institutions and 
national governments by the new economic governance framework. To this should 
be added initiatives towards more growth friendly fiscal adjustment favouring, for 
example, investment spending. 
…and significant adjustment and reform in member countries 
There has been considerable macroeconomic and fiscal adjustment in the euro area 
since the start of the global financial and economic crisis, in particular in countries 
implementing adjustment programmes. However, although “flow” imbalances were 
considerably reduced, “stock” imbalances continued rising as a percentage of GDP, 
due mainly to weak economic growth. 
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After two years of recession in 2012 and 2013, economic recovery has been gradual 
but unequal across countries, although the gap in GDP growth rates between 
peripheral and core countries is closing18. The employment situation has been very 
diverse among member states, reflecting their unequal economic performance during 
the crisis, and the unemployment rate has been very high in countries severely hit by 
the crisis. Financial markets fragmentation has been receding, but very slowly in 
some parts of the euro area. 
Significant fiscal adjustment but still high the debt ratio 
The general government deficit of the euro area as a whole was reduced from a peak 
of 6.4% of GDP in 2009 to 2.9% of GDP in 2013, a trend reflecting a fall in fiscal 
deficits in most member countries. However, the government debt ratio continued to 
rise, due mainly to weak economic activity, and is estimated to have reached 94.5% 
of GDP in 2014 from a low level of 64.9% of GDP in 2007. While the government 
debt ratio increased in all euro zone countries during the above period, its rise was 
particularly steep in those member states severely hit by the sovereign debt crisis. 
According to current forecasts, the euro area government debt ratio is expected to 
peak in 2015 at 94.8% of GDP and start falling thereafter. 
The government debt ratio is a crucial factor in the effort to strengthen financial 
stability in the euro area and avoid a reversal and return to situations characterized 
by uncertainty and a crisis of confidence. The establishment of a falling trend in the 
government debt ratio in individual member states with high government debt and in 
the euro area as a whole should be a policy priority, through an optimal combination 
of fiscal adjustment and other financial operations (e.g. privatizations). 
 
3. EU/IMF economic programmes: analytical and institutional aspects 
EU/IMF economic programmes, implemented by a number of euro area member 
countries since the emergence of the sovereign debt crisis, have been an important 
part of the response to the crisis by the EU institutions and national governments. It 
is, therefore, natural that the design, implementation and overall management of the 
programmes be the subject of examination and assessment by independent analysts 
and official bodies, such as Committees of the European Parliament who focus on 
the institutional and political aspects of the programmes. 
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Analytical aspects 
Although two euro area countries, Ireland and Portugal, concluded their respective 
economic programmes successfully at the end of 2013 and in early 2014, 
respectively, - and have entered the “post-programme” monitoring (see below) - the 
discussion about EU/IMF economic programmes was dominated by the management 
and performance of the Greek economic programme. This is understandable due to 
the wider implications of the Greek programme and because the implementation of 
the first Greek programme was marked by a number of weaknesses, as key targets 
were missed. The first Greek economic programme was re-negotiated in 2012 and a 
second programme was agreed involving new macroeconomic and fiscal targets and 
a new loan agreement. 
Looking at the results of the implementation of the first EU/IMF economic programme 
for Greece and taking account of reports and studies by several independent 
analysts25, international institutions, notably the troika institutions, as well as the 
reports and resolution on the troika by Committees of the European Parliament, it 
appears that the main reasons behind key failures of the first Greek programme can 
be summarised as follows (although other, more technical, factors such as those 
related to the size of fiscal multipliers may also be relevant): 
The lack of “national ownership” of the programme had been, and to a large extent 
continues to be, a serious drag on its successful implementation, as necessary 
structural reforms and adjustments cannot be easily accepted by society. It is 
noteworthy that even the government coalition parties who had agreed the 
programme used to describe it as a “necessary evil” that had to be implemented 
because it was requested by the troika. 
The second main reason concerns troika institutions: contrary to conventional 
wisdom, and prior expectations, the troika institutions, notably the IMF and the 
European Commission, had no experience of economic adjustment in a monetary 
union, in particular in cases of highly indebted countries (the ECB being a new 
institution with a specific mandate was not expected to have such an experience). In 
particular, although the IMF had an experience of over 150 economic adjustment 
programmes, the adjustment practically always included sizeable devaluations of the 
currency, often of the order of 30% to 50%, something impossible in a monetary 
union. The European Commission likewise, though it had some experience in 
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monitoring balance of payments loans, had no experience of adjustment in a 
monetary union. 
On the first issue, the reasons for the lack of national ownership of economic 
programmes and ways to remedy the situation should be examined. Indispensable 
elements of any remedial action include transparency about the economic situation 
and avoidance of untenable promises and unsustainable policies by political parties. 
How might lack of national ownership affect the implementation of the programme? 
Usually it works both ways: weak commitment by governments to pursue necessary 
reforms and adjustments interacts and reinforces “resistance” by citizens to reforms 
perceived as unnecessary and unfair. On the basis of these findings, troika‟s 
argument that missing targets of the first Greek programme are mainly due to 
inadequate commitment to reforms seems to have some basis, without fully 
explaining the huge divergence between targets and outcome. 
Regarding the second issue, it was stated, explicitly and implicitly, on several 
occasions, by IMF officials that there was inadequate knowledge of the dynamics of 
adjustment in a monetary union. Indeed, there are reasons to conclude that there 
was inadequate knowledge about the adverse consequences on economic growth 
and, as a consequence on the debt dynamics, of internal devaluation. The 
requirement for “expenditure-reducing policies” and “expenditure-switching policies” 
for a successful external adjustment is wellknown in the literature. A reduction in 
internal demand, notably through fiscal consolidation contributes to reducing 
domestic absorption liberating resources for export. Devaluation facilitates 
expenditure switching by making domestic production more price-competitive in 
foreign and domestic markets. Devaluation and internal devaluation may have the 
same objective, to reduce the relative prices of domestic goods and improve 
competitiveness, but would have very different side effects: devaluation increases 
domestic output and raises domestic price level and nominal income, and thus 
reduces the real burden of debt, while internal devaluation reduces domestic output 
and prices and lead to a rise, and in some cases a sharp rise, in the government debt 
ratio, as was the case in Greece. 
Institutional issues 
Concerning institutional aspects, the resolution of the European Parliament states 
that “The EU/ECB/MF “Troika” helped four EU countries through the crisis and 
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prevented it from getting worse. But the flawed structure and working methods 
hindered national “ownership” and compromised transparency and accountability”. 
The resolution recommends, as a first step, that there should be clear, transparent 
and binding rules of procedure and for the medium-term recommends a radical 
overhaul of the Troika, in which the IMF involvement would become optional, the 
ECB would be present only as an observer and the European Commission role 
would be taken over by a “European Monetary Fund”. The above recommendations 
seem sensible overall and could improve the management of the programmes with 
the following adaptations: 
The IMF could be associated to the programmes as a consultant, without providing 
funds and, thus, contributing only through its “authority of knowledge” status. The 
European Commission should have the overall responsibility for the design, 
implementation and management of economic programmes, being thus accountable 
to EU Council, the Eurogroup and, of course, to the European Parliament who may 
even impose sanctions on Commissioners in case of notable failures. As a 
consequence, the current diffusion of responsibility between the troika institutions will 
cease. The ECB could participate in the design and monitoring of the programmes to 
the extent that such a role is compatible with its mandate and its independence 
status regarding monetary policy. 
As for the creation of a European Monetary Fund, the idea should not be rejected a 
priori but there are certain shortcomings: it would add to the proliferation of European 
institutions and would create some confusion with the role of the ECB, notably in 
connection with the term “monetary”. The assumption of the key role by the 
European Commission has the additional advantage that a European institution also 
responsible for monitoring and ensuring the respect of European economic and fiscal 
rules and internal market legislation, will have also the responsibility for the design 
and implementation of economic programmes and be accountable for any errors and 
misjudgements. 
Priority given to stability was justified but robust growth is also essential 
Taking account of the devastating effects on several member countries‟ economies 
and the rising risks of euro area disintegration provoked by the sovereign debt crisis, 
it can be safely argued that the priority given by the EU to financial stability, in the 
broader sense comprising sustainability of public finance and financial sector 
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stability, was fully justified, despite some initial weaknesses in policy action which 
were corrected in 2012. 
Moreover, as the sovereign debt crisis has been contained but not yet overcome, 
financial stability must continue to be a top priority of policy action until the new 
economic governance architecture and institutions have passed the test of time. This 
requirement looks a bit “intimidating” but it should not be so. 
It only means that while new institutions and mechanisms are tested by financial 
markets and actions of important stakeholders - electorates, parliaments, national 
and European courts28- the issue of financial stability must be given particular 
attention in order to avoid disturbances and rising uncertainty which could be 
detrimental for both financial stability and economic growth. 
As a result of policy initiatives and progress in adjustment and reform, financial 
stability in the euro area was strengthened steadily from the second half of 2012. The 
successful exit of Ireland and Portugal from their EU/IMF programmes, and of Spain 
from the EU financial sector restructuring programme, and significant progress 
towards adjustment and reform in Greece, notably within the framework of the 
second programme, and more recently in Cyprus, are also parts of a positive picture. 
However, important challenges remain. A crucial element in order to durably ensure 
financial stability is to achieve the stabilization and then the decline in high 
government debt ratios in several member countries and in the euro area as a whole. 
This is indispensable in order to avoid the risk of a reversal of the drive towards 
sustainable public finances, give a strong signal to financial markets about long-term 
fiscal sustainability and initiate a virtuous circle for the euro area economy. 
Therefore, care must be taken to ensure the sustainability of public finances even if 
agreement is reached, as it is currently requested by certain governments, to relax, 
provisionally or permanently, certain fiscal rules, beyond the degree of flexibility that 
already exists. 
Priority to financial stability does not imply that growth considerations are of 
secondary importance in EMU. On the contrary, in the medium to long term, robust 
economic growth is essential for both financial stability and overall welfare and 
should be a constant policy objective at central and national level. It should be noted 
in this context that concerns expressed during the first two years of the sovereign 
debt crisis, notably by credit rating agencies, about risks to financial stability in a 
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number of euro area economies and of the integrity of the euro area itself, were 
related essentially to their capacity to achieve robust enough economic growth - an 
essential factor for financial and fiscal sustainability - and less by their commitment to 
fiscal adjustment. This aspect was obviously not well understood at the time. The real 
challenge for European institutions and national authorities in the new EMU 2.0 era is 
to find the right balance between these two objectives so that stability and growth 
policies are mutually reinforcing.  
 
4. Policies for stability and growth are possible in EMU 2.0 
Policies enhancing both stability and growth are possible in EMU and most of them 
have started being implemented, while others are at an advanced stage of 
development. Such policies include economic rebalancing, guided by the 
implementation of the EU macroeconomic imbalance procedure, that is expected to 
have larger positive implications than usually assumed, the banking union project, an 
essential element of financial stability and financial integration, and new initiatives to 
achieve effective integration in the European Internal Market which is the most 
important asset in the effort to strengthen economic recovery and enhance the 
growth potential of the European economy. The single monetary policy, aims to 
create uniform monetary conditions within the euro area by pursuing its price stability 
objective, contributes to financial stability and economic growth but also to the 
effective unification of the internal market by enhancing integration of financial 
markets. 
To the above should be added policies directly supporting economic growth. They 
include policies to support private and public investment, indispensable for 
strengthening economic activity and enhancing Europe‟s growth potential, more 
growth-enhancing policies at both national and central level focused on structural 
reforms in labour and product markets and actions to improve the business 
environment, including a re-focusing of competition and industrial policies, and a 
more growth-friendly fiscal consolidation and external trade and investment policies 
based on openness and reciprocity. 
Although most of the above policies have been in place for some time now, much 
more needs to be done at both the national level, where implementation of 
adjustment and reform has often been weak, and at the EU level, where a refocusing 
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of economic policy is needed to enhance the productive potential of the European 
economy and promote real convergence. The focus in this section is on some key 
areas which are essential for both stability and growth in the EU and the euro area 
and are also related to the new policy framework. 
As a consequence, although financial stability, supported by credible institutions and 
appropriate policies, is a precondition for any successful initiatives to improve 
economic performance, it matters a lot how financial stability is achieved and 
maintained. The ECB‟s intervention in 2012 was decisive in helping to lower the 
yields of government bonds - and thus the borrowing cost of sovereigns but also of 
the whole economy - from the unsustainable levels they had reached at the peak of 
the crisis. However, this decision needs to be followed by consistent adjustment and 
reform effort to enhance the performance of the euro area economy. 
Economic rebalancing would have far-reaching, positive effects 
The objective of the “macroeconomic imbalances procedure” - to prevent and correct 
excessive imbalances which may jeopardize the proper functioning of EMU - is 
expected to have positive effects for both financial stability and economic growth. Its 
relevance to financial stability is obvious, bearing in mind the adverse effects of the 
accumulated internal and external imbalances in the first decade of EMU. Positive 
effects on economic growth are also expected from this reform, as the obligation to 
contain macroeconomic imbalances will lead to policies seeking internal and external 
balance resulting, if successful, in lower external imbalances within the euro area - in 
particular in a reduction of the very high current account surpluses in some countries 
–and reduced current account surpluses vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Such a 
development is expected to contain euro appreciation against the main world 
currencies, a major concern of exporters in euro area countries. 
Moreover, there is a political economy/institutional aspect to the rebalancing strategy: 
the containment of imbalances within the euro area would reduce the over-
dependence of debtor on creditor countries, a situation which, combined with the 
tendency to rely on intergovernmental solutions in order to cope with crisis-related 
problems, often implies difficult relations and tensions. Therefore such a 
development is expected to have positive effects on the cooperation between 
member countries and the functioning of the economic and monetary union. 
The banking union is essential for stability and important for growth 
Athens MBA; “Contagion effects in the government bond 
markets. Evidence from the EMU 2.0 crisis” 
 
Ιωάννης Ξηνταρόπουλος                                     2016 Page 71 
 
Priority given by the euro area summit in June 2012 to a rapid advance towards 
banking union, as part of a broader plan to move to a higher degree of integration in 
EMU, was justified by the need to break the vicious circle between banks and 
sovereigns, which had led the sovereign debt crisis into a difficult-tocontrol downward 
spiral. It was also concluded at the summit that “when an effective single supervisory 
mechanism is established, involving the ECB, for banks in the euro area the ESM 
could, following a regular decision, have the possibility to recapitalize banks directly”, 
a provision aimed, precisely, to work in the direction of severing the link between 
banks and sovereigns as the cost of bank recapitalisation would not burden individual 
country‟s public debt. 
In December 2012 the European Council agreed on the key elements of the banking 
union and on the issue of direct recapitalisation of banks, under certain conditions, by 
the ESM. This political guidance was followed by the adoption of EU legislation in 
order to set up the main building blocks of the banking union: a single supervisory 
mechanism, which introduces a unified banking supervision in the euro area and 
other participating member states under the responsibility of the ECB, a single 
resolution mechanism with a single resolution fund which will ensure that if a bank 
faces serious difficulties, its resolution can be managed efficiently with minimal costs 
to taxpayers and the real economy. A system of harmonized national deposit 
guarantee schemes will be in place from 2015 and a single system for guaranteeing 
deposits is expected to come later. 
A well-designed and properly implemented banking union, besides being essential 
for financial stability, will be also important for economic growth, as a) re-integration 
of European credit markets would enable them to play fully their role in financing the 
real economy and b) repair of the monetary transmission mechanism will ensure that 
ECB‟s low interest rates be effectively passed on to those countries that probably 
need them most. 
The qualifications “well-designed” and “properly implemented” are important, as 
concerns have been raised about the time-horizon within which the banking union 
project will attain financial maturity and be fully operational, judged to be too long - 
although shortened to eight years compared to ten years initially proposed - entailing 
considerable risks if an emergency occurs, and the legal form the single resolution 
fund would take, i.e. that of an intergovernmental international agreement, 
considered to imply legal and operational risks. 
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Another criticism was that the project lacks in effect a public backstop in the event of 
a really big crisis and in this sense cannot be a substitute for a genuine fiscal union 
as some suggest that it might be. Indeed, according to some authors a banking union 
can respond to most important and costly shocks, arising from financial boom-bust 
cycles, followed by financial crisis, such as the global financial crisis and the euro 
area sovereign debt crisis, making thus redundant a fiscal union. However such a 
role would require that a banking union is equipped with an effective backstop 
capacity (which could take the form of a common deposit insurance scheme as in the 
USA). 
Regardless of the validity of the argument about the necessity or not of a fiscal union 
and, as a consequence, of a high degree of political union in EMU, the banking union 
project presents a number of significant advantages: it benefits from strong and wide 
political support, its establishment is well-advanced and, centered on ECB 
supervision, it seems to fulfill the right conditions to play a decisive role in improving 
the stability and the efficient operation of EMU. 
It should be noted, however, that the popularity of the banking union project is based 
to a large degree on the expectation that it could achieve very substantial 
improvement in the stability and operation of EMU without much economic cost to the 
European taxpayer and with no political cost to governments in comparison to a 
move towards fiscal union which is currently rather unpopular in public opinion in 
several member states. Several analysts have expressed doubts whether the 55 
billion euros which could be mobilized by the single resolution fund by the end of the 
transitional period for its maturity would suffice to meet all eventualities. It should be 
noted, however, that besides the 55 billion euros of the fund, there will be also the 
possibility of recourse to  he European Stability Mechanism and to financial markets, 
in case of need, in order to acquire the necessary funds before recouping them from 
the banking industry ex post. 
An effective integration of the Internal Market would boost growth and 
employment 
A unified internal market is the most valuable asset of EMU, giving businesses and 
private persons the opportunity to benefit from a large integrated market of over half 
a billion people. A unified internal market is also a key factor for attracting foreign 
direct investment. 
Athens MBA; “Contagion effects in the government bond 
markets. Evidence from the EMU 2.0 crisis” 
 
Ιωάννης Ξηνταρόπουλος                                     2016 Page 73 
 
Financial fragmentation, as a result of the sovereign debt crisis, constituted a 
reversal of financial integration - and as a consequence a reversal of the drive 
towards a unified internal market - achieved over the past decades through the free 
movement of people, goods and capital, the free provision of services and, finally, by 
the introduction of the euro. It is therefore of the utmost importance to re-establish 
financial markets integration and achieve an effective integration of the European 
internal market which was supposed to be completed by 1992 but in many respects 
is still incomplete. But despite these reversals in the integration process, available 
evidence indicates that the benefits from integration in specific areas have been 
significant. 
It is important for the EU institutions to mobilize efforts to achieve the policy 
objectives for which they have full responsibility and capacity to act. According to the 
European principle of “subsidiarity” each level of authority (national-European) has to 
act in priority in the areas where it has more authority and competence. And although 
obstacles to the effective completion of the internal market are most often put by 
member states, the EU, notably the European Commission, as the guardian of the 
treaties, and the ECB as far as banks and payment systems are concerned, have the 
legal authority and operational capacity to achieve the objective of market integration. 
There are signs that financial fragmentation, is receding but we are still far from a 
normalization of credit conditions and a proper functioning of the financial system in 
several member states. As a consequence, the normalization of such conditions 
should be a priority for all authorities concerned. 
The crisis underlined also the need to develop a European capital market, a sort of 
capital union in addition to banking union, and rely less on the banking system for the 
financing of the real economy, notably the business sector, as more diversified 
financial markets reduce the likelihood of borrowing constraints. It is a positive 
development that enterprises, mainly larger ones, in crisis-hit countries have turned 
increasingly to capital markets to fund their investment projects and overall activity in 
view of the difficult access to bank credit. 
Supporting public and private investment 
There is broad agreement among policy makers and independent analysts that a 
significant increase in investment is necessary in order to strengthen the pace of 
recovery and enhance the growth potential of the European economy. There are 
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currently investment shortfalls in virtually all countries and in the euro area in 
particular, although the situation varies greatly among its member countries: 
investment, as percent of GDP, declined by about four percentage points in euro 
area total but by much more, between 8 p.p. and 14 p.p., in the countries most 
severely hit by the crisis. 
The analysis of factors underlying this investment decline in the euro area indicates 
that the most significant causes have been weak economic activity and prospects for 
lower growth potential compared with the pre-crisis period, the need for economic 
restructuring and reduction of excess productive capacity in specific sectors, such as 
the construction sector - notably in Spain and in Ireland - , and the reduction of 
indebtedness by the corporate and household sectors. 
Additional factors, related to the sovereign debt crisis, which have adversely affected 
public and private investment, are the decline in public investment in the effort to 
consolidate public finances, financial market fragmentation which adversely affected 
capacity to finance investment projects, and the high degree of uncertainty, probably 
the most significant factor in investment decline since 2009. 
The negative influence of most of the above factors has been diminishing in recent 
quarters, as economic recovery is gradually picking up, progress in economic 
governance and in establishing a banking union is reversing financial fragmentation 
and reducing uncertainty, while reduced macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances make 
less pressing the need for further fiscal consolidation, leaving thus space for a rise in 
public investment. Also, a change in the growth model in economies hit by the crisis, 
away from private and public consumption and towards investment and exports, 
along with a shift towards more productive investment, would increase domestically 
generated savings and avoid aggravating fiscal and current accounts. Under certain 
conditions debt-financed investment projects could have large output effects without 
increasing the debt to- GDP ratio. 
However, the investment recovery which started in the second quarter of 2013 has 
been slow and more direct initiatives are needed to support investment and growth in 
the euro area and in the EU more generally. In this context there were proposals to 
modify EU fiscal rules, by excluding government investment expenditure from the 
calculation of fiscal deficits within the Stability and Growth Pact, in order to 
encourage public investment. 
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Regardless of the treatment of public investment within the EU fiscal rules, it is clear 
that the bulk of the investment needed should come from the private sector, as public 
investment accounts, on average, for less than one fifth of total investment in the 
euro area. Action at EU level, using all available institutions and mechanisms can 
support both public and private investment by improving public infrastructures and 
creating synergies between public and private initiatives.  
The plan of J. C. Juncker, new European Commission President, for investments of 
at least €315 billion over three years by the combined action of several European 
institutions and mechanisms. 
 
5. Remarking Conclusions 
From the analysis of the emergence and the management of the global and the 
sovereign debt crises useful lessons can be drawn for the design of public policy, at 
EU and national level, within the new economic governance framework. A number of 
suggestions in this direction are included in this paper. Shortcomings in EMU‟s 
institutional framework did not allow timely preventive action before the emergence of 
the crisis and complicated corrective action when the crisis occurred, while some 
weaknesses in the application of fiscal rules aggravated institutional shortcomings. 
A turning point in the effort to overcome the sovereign debt crisis occurred in 2012, 
when ECB initiatives, supported by a critical mass of institutional and economic 
reforms, succeeded in neutralising risks of euro area disintegration. At the same 
time, the decision to create a banking union was designed to strengthen financial 
stability, financial markets integration and the European internal market. 
It is a central point of this paper that the European strategy to preserve and 
strengthen financial stability was fully justified. There was ample evidence about this 
during the first two years of the crisis when uncertainty about financial stability in the 
euro area paralyzed attempts to revive the economy. However, it is also clear that 
robust economic growth is essential both for financial stability and overall welfare. 
Therefore the creation of conditions for economic recovery and sustainable growth 
must be a constant policy objective at EU and at national level. 
Policies enhancing both stability and growth are possible in EMU and some of them 
have already started being implemented while others are at an advanced stage of 
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development. They include economic rebalancing, guided by the implementation of 
the macroeconomic imbalance procedure, which is expected to have broader, 
positive implications than usually assumed, the banking union, a project essential for 
stability and important for growth, and new initiatives to achieve an effective 
integration of the European internal market. To the above should be added policies 
directly supporting economic growth. They include policies to support private and 
public investment, indispensable for strengthening economic activity and enhancing 
Europe‟s economic potential, more growth-enhancing policies at both national and 
central level. 
What is the scope for national policies in the new economic governance framework? 
No easy answers exist, as we are here in uncharted territory: the crisis has not yet 
been overcome and some parts of the new legislation have not yet been fully 
implemented. With these qualifications in mind it can be argued that there is ample 
room for national economic policy which, if well-designed and properly implemented, 
will enhance the growth potential of member countries. The new policy environment 
is safer, as weaknesses in EMU‟s architecture have been largely corrected, but also 
more challenging: well intentioned but largely unfulfilled declarations about the need 
for “growthenhancing structural reforms”, “growth-friendly fiscal consolidation” and for 
policies supporting innovation and research must be given real content in an optimal 
and sustainable way by mobilizing all available resources and expertise. 
Priorities identified at European level can provide guidance for action also at national 
level. However, legacy problems, such as the excessive government debt burden in 
some countries, must be resolved. 
A final word refers to doubts often expressed about euro area‟s prospects: the euro 
area‟s strengthened economic and financial governance, sound economic 
fundamentals, including a robust export performance, and a largely unexploited 
potential of the internal market provide reasons to conclude that euro area‟s 
prospects can be bright. But their realization requires some key elements: readiness 
to further improve economic governance, commitment to sound macroeconomic, 
monetary and financial policies, increased investment in physical and human capital, 
a positive attitude to innovation and reform and openness towards the rest of the 
world while protecting European interests. It requires also a commitment to and 
active participation in the European project with ideas, initiatives, proposals and 
concrete work towards achieving common objectives. 
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